Homeland

"Out of Evil comes a Great Good"

Address to the nation, George W. Bush November 8. 2001

Excerpt from the "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion"

16. Out of the temporary evil we are now compelled to commit will emerge the good of an unshakable rule, which will restore the regular course of the machinery of the national life, brought to naught by liberalism. The result justifies the means. Let us, however, in our plans, direct our attention not so much to what is good and moral as to what is necessary and useful.

Mt:7:18:

 A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.

Rom:3:8: And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil, that good may come? whose damnation is just.

Excerpt from "Protocols"

16. Out of the temporary evil we are now compelled to commit will emerge the good of an unshakable rule, which will restore the regular course of the machinery of the national life, brought to naught by liberalism. The result justifies the means. Let us, however, in our plans, direct our attention not so much to what is good and moral as to what is necessary and useful. (Excerpt from the Government disputed "Protocols of the Learned Elders of the Babylonian Mystical Talmudic Qabalah" otherwise known as the "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion")

Homeland Security

A wonderful idea when Hitler had it, and....

After the Twin World Trade Center destruction, except that....

It has all been established beforehand upon a pre-planned "Terrorist Strike" on American soil.

A Small price to pay for Global Dictatorship under the final Despotic World King

"The Plan"

www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf

Without legislation, the most profound unconstitutional governmental change in the history of the United States of America has began.

Without as much as a squeak from the masses, we the people have just lost our very last semblance of what many think is our undeniable right for liberty.

" Freedom is just another word for nothing else to lose"

Janice Joplin

Excerpt from the 

"Protocols of the Learned Elders of the Babylonian Talmudic Mystical Qabalah of Zion"

otherwise known as the widely disputed

"Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion"

7. In our day the power which has replaced that of the rulers who were liberal is the power of Gold. Time was when Faith ruled. The idea of freedom is impossible of realization because no one knows how to use it with moderation. It is enough to hand over a people to self-government for a certain length of time for that people to be turned into a disorganized mob. From that moment on we get internecine strife which soon develops into battles between classes, in the midst of which States burn down and their importance is reduced to that of a heap of ashes.

8. Whether a State exhausts itself in its own convulsions, whether its internal discord brings it under the power of external foes - in any case it can be accounted irretrievable lost: IT IS IN OUR POWER. The despotism of Capital, which is entirely in our hands, reaches out to it a straw that the State, *willy-nilly, must take hold of: if not - it goes to the bottom.

*Please take note of this term

9. Should anyone of a liberal mind say that such reflections as the above are immoral, I would put the following questions: If every State has two foes and if in regard to the external foe it is allowed and not considered immoral to use every manner and art of conflict, as for example to keep the enemy in ignorance of plans of attack and defense, to attack him by night or in superior numbers, then in what way can the same means in regard to a worse foe, the destroyer of the structure of society and the commonweal, be called immoral and not permissible?

Roadmap for National Security:

Imperative for change

Final Draft Report

Embargoed until Jan 31, 2001

Miriam Webster Dictionary

3 : STOPPAGE, IMPEDIMENT; especially : PROHIBITION <I lay no embargo on anybody's words -- Jane Austen>

Wonder why it was embargoed until Jan. 31, 2001?

The Phase Three Report of The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

The Commission Members

Gary Hart

Why was the Hart Senate Building attacked with Anthrax?

Sept. 12, 2001 | WASHINGTON -- They went to great pains not to sound as though they were telling the president "We told you so."

But Wait a moment, why did George W. Bush, abruptly change his mind after the "Predicted Terrorism"? 

Warren B. Rudman

Warren B. Rudman is founding co-chairman of the Concord Coalition.

Senator Rudman became a partner in the international law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison after serving two distinguished terms as a U.S. Senator from New Hampshire. The Senator maintains offices with the law firm both in Washington and New York, and on his own in New Hampshire. He was first elected to the Senate in 1980, and was overwhelmingly reelected in 1986.

Born on May 18, 1930, Senator Rudman is a life-long New Hampshire resident. He received a B.S. from Syracuse University in 1952 and served in the U.S. Army as a combat platoon leader and company commander during the Korean War. In 1960 he received his LL.B. from Boston College Law School. Senator Rudman began his career practicing law in his hometown of Nashua. In 1970, he was appointed Attorney General of New Hampshire. He later joined the Manchester, N.H., law firm Sheehan, Phinney, Bass, and Green, where he currently maintains an office part-time.

During his 12 years in the Senate, Senator Rudman established a record of independence by refusing to accept out-of-state political action committee donations. Perhaps his best-known accomplishment came in 1985, when he co-authored the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law, a historic step that imposed discipline and accountability on the chaotic budget process in order to reduce the federal deficit.

In December 1986, Senator Rudman was appointed to serve as Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee investigating arms transfers to Iran. He also served on the Ethics Committee and presided over numerous investigations, including the Keating Five. Senator Rudman served on the Senate Appropriations Committee, and was active on the Subcommittees on Defense and Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, where he served as Ranking Republican. While supporting a strong military, he actively opposed expensive weapons that were not cost effective. He also served on the Intelligence Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Senator Rudman's inside account of his career in the Senate is detailed in his book, Combat: Twelve years in the U.S. Senate, published by Random House in 1996.

President Clinton appointed Senator Rudman as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in the fall of 1993, where he now serves as Vice Chairman. In addition, he was appointed by the President to serve as Vice Chairman of the Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community. He also serves on the Board of Trustees of Boston College, Valley Forge Military Academy, the Brookings Institution, and the Aspen Institute. He is also a member of the Senior Advisory Committee of the Institute of Politics and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

Anne Armstrong

Norman R. Augustine

Lockheed Martin CEO and Chairman NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE'S steady march toward the top of the defense-consolidation hill is paying off big. Since last April's deal for Loral, Lockheed has won all seven of the major Pentagon contracts it sought. Now, the $30 billion Goliath stands neck-and-neck with Boeing to grab the biggest prize of all: a contract to build the $200 billion Joint Strike Fighter

Again, But of Course, the Military Complex

John Dancy

Yes indeed we must include the Media, mustn't we

John R. Galvin

Leslie H. Gelb

Yes, we must have the "One World Order" Globalist Elite of the Council On Foreign Affairs onboard.

Newt Gingrich

Who wore the t-shirt on national televised media which stated "Order out of Chaos" The terminology of the Illuminati

Newt Gingrich

EDUCATION

Bachelors, Emory University

Masters, Tulane University

Doctorate, Modern European History, Tulane University

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE-HIGHLIGHTS

Speaker of the House, US House of Representatives

 Congressman, Georgia, US House of Representatives

Professor, History and Environmental Studies, West Georgia College

HONORS AND AFFILIATIONS

Named Distinguished Visitor Scholar at the National Defense University on February 28, 2001 for outstanding contributions in the fields of leadership and
national security at the National Defense University 1981-2001

Georgian of the Year, 1995

Citizen of the Year, Georgia March of Dimes, 1995

Man of the Year, TIME Magazine, 1995

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Author, Window of Opportunity

Author, Contract With America

Author, To Renew America

Author, Lessons Learned the Hard Way

First Republican Speaker elected since 1928

Lee H. Hamilton

Lionel H. Olmer

Donald B. Rice

James Schlesinger

Harry D. Train

Andrew Young

And yes the One World Religion must be included into the plan.

NCC at a Glance: Who Belongs, How It Works, What It Does

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA is the nation's leading organization in the movement for Christian ecumenical cooperation. The NCC's 36 Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox member communions and denominations include more than 50 million persons in 140,000 local congregations in communities across the United States.

Member Communions

    NCC member communions reflect the diversity of Christianity in the United States.   Protestant members include churches of European origin, historic African American churches, and immigrant churches from Korea and India.  Orthodox member communions have roots in Greece, Syria, Russia, the Ukraine, Egypt, India and other places where Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy have long histories. 

   NCC member communions vary greatly in size and in the geographic distribution of their congregations.  Each brings distinctive faith traditions to the NCC's common table.  The NCC believes that genuine unity demands inclusivity and a respect for diversity, and strives to embody this belief in its programs, decision-making and staffing.

    Some 280 representatives of the member communions come together annually as the General Assembly, the NCC's highest policy-making body.  An Executive Board, which meets several times a year, acts on behalf of the General Assembly in many matters.  Click here for a list of current officers of the NCC.

Homeland Security Directorate

Gary (Shandra Levy) Condit on Homeland Security Panel?

Excert From "Protocols"

13. In order that our scheme may produce this result we shall arrange elections in favor of such presidents as have in their past some dark, undiscovered stain, some "Panama" or other - then they will be trustworthy agents for the accomplishment of our plans out of fear of revelations and from the natural desire of everyone who has attained power, namely, the retention of the privileges, advantages and honor connected with the office of president

Your New Founding Fathers..., and Mothers?

Excerpts from

"Road Map for National Security"

Foreword

American power and influence have been decisive factors for democracy and security throughout the last half century.

(Once again Republic has been left out of the New World Terminology of Democracy.)

However after two years of serious effort, This COMMISSION has concluded that without significant reforms, American Power and influence cannot be sustained.

(We will not be the World's Global Governance leader)

To be of long term benefit to us and others, that power and influence must be disciplined by strategy, defined as the systematic determination of the proper relationship of ends to means in support of American principles, interest and national purpose.

Contents

Foreword, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman

Preface, Charles G. Boyd

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction: Imperative for Change

I. Securing the National Homeland

A. The Strategic Framework

B. Organizational Realignment.

C. Executive-Legislative Cooperation

II. Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education

A. Investing in Innovation

B. Education as a National Security Imperative

III. Institutional Redesign

A. Strategic Planning and Budgeting

B. The National Security Council

C. Department of State

D. Department of Defense

E. Space Policy

F. The Intelligence Community

IV. The Human Requirements for National Security

A. A National Campaign for Service to the Nation

B. The Presidential Appointments Process.

C. The Foreign Service

D. The Civil Service

E. Military Personnel

V. The Role of Congress

A Final Word

Appendix 1: The Recommendations

Appendix 2: The USCNS/21 Charter
Appendix 3: Commissioner Biographies and Staff Listing

Foreword

 

American power and influence have been decisive factors for democracy and security throughout the last half-century. However, after more than two years of serious effort, this Commission has concluded that without *significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained. To be of long-term benefit to us and to others, that power and influence must be disciplined by strategy, defined as the systematic determination of the proper relationship of ends to means in support of American principles, interests, and national purpose.

* without legislation

 

This Commission was established to redefine national security in this age and to do so in a more comprehensive fashion than any other similar effort since *1947. We have carried out our duties in an independent and totally bipartisan spirit. This report is a blueprint for reorganizing the U.S. national security structure in order to focus that structure's attention on the most important new and serious problems before the nation, and to produce organizational competence capable of addressing those problems creatively.

*world war II-United Nations

 

The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat. Without creative strategic planning in this new environment, we will default in time of crisis to a reactive posture. Such a posture is inadequate to the challenges and opportunities before us.

 

We have concluded that, despite the end of the Cold War threat, America faces distinctly new dangers, particularly to the homeland and to our scientific and educational base. These dangers must be addressed forthwith.

 

We call upon the new President, the new administration, the new Congress, and the country at large to consider and debate our recommendations in the pragmatic spirit that has characterized America and its people in each new age. (Or else? sic)

 

Gary Hart Warren

Co-Chair

 

B. Rudman

Co-Chair

 

 

Preface

 

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century was born more than two years ago out of a conviction that the entire range of U.S. national security policies and processes required reexamination in light of new circumstances. Those circumstances encompass not only the changed geopolitical reality after the Cold War, but also the significant technological, social, and intellectual changes that are occurring.

 

Prominent among such changes is the information revolution and the accelerating discontinuities in a range of scientific and technological areas. Another is the increased integration of global finance and commerce, commonly called "globalization." Yet another is the ascendance of democratic governance and free-market economics to unprecedented levels, and another still the increasing importance of both multinational and non-governmental actors in global affairs. (Technocracy ?)

The routines of professional life, too, in business, university, and other domains in advanced countries have been affected by the combination of new technologies and new management techniques. The internal cultures of organizations have been changing, usually in ways that make them more efficient and effective.

 

The creators of this Commission believed that unless the U.S. government adapts itself to these changes-and to dramatic changes still to come-it will fall out of step with the world of the 21st century. Nowhere will the risks of doing so be more manifest than in the realm of national security.

(If we don't we are doomed?)

 

Mindful of the likely scale of change ahead, this Commission's sponsors urged it to be bold and comprehensive in its undertaking. That meant thinking out a quarter century, not just to the next election or to the next federal budget cycle. That meant searching out how government should work, (simply forget the founding fathers?)

 undeterred by the institutional inertia that today determines how it does work. Not least, it meant conceiving national security not as narrowly defined, but as it ought to be defined-to include economics, technology, and education for a new age in which novel opportunities and challenges coexist uncertainly with familiar ones.

 

The fourteen Commissioners involved in this undertaking, one that engaged their energies for over two years, have worked hard and they have worked well.*2 Best of all, despite diverse experiences and views, they have transcended partisanship to work together in recognition of the seriousness of the task: nothing less than to assure the well-being of this Republic a quarter century hence.

They admitted to Republic but are escaping this Republic's Constitution without vote by the people, for the people's concerns.

 

This Commission has conducted its work in three phases. Phase I was dedicated to understanding how the world will likely evolve over the next 25 years. From that basis in prospective reality, Phase II devised a U.S. national security strategy to deal with that world. Phase III aims to reform government structures and processes to enable the U.S. government to implement that strategy, or, indeed, any strategy that would depart from the embedded routines of the last half-century.

Or from the Constitution?

 

Phase I concluded in September 1999 with the publication of New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century.*3 Phase II produced the April 2000 publication, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom. Phase III, presented in these pages, is entitled Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. This report summarizes enough of the Commission's Phase I and Phase II work to establish an intellectual basis for understanding this Phase III report, but it does not repeat the texts of prior phases in detail. For those seeking fuller background to this report, the Commission's earlier works should be consulted directly.*4

 

In Road Map for National Security, the Commission has endeavored to complete the logic of its three phases of work, moving from analysis to strategy to the redesign of the structures and processes of the U.S. national security system. For example, in Phase I the Commission stressed that mass-casualty terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland was of serious and growing concern. (see Twin Towers 9-11-2001)

 It therefore proposed in Phase II a strategy that prioritizes deterring, defending against, and responding effectively to such dangers. Thus, in Phase III, it recommends a new National Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate departments and agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security today.

Sept. 27, 1933 Reichstag fire - Nazis blamed communists
 

That said, not every Phase I finding and not every Phase II proposal has generated a major Phase III recommendation. Not every aspect of U.S. national security organization needs an overhaul. Moreover, some challenges are best met, and some opportunities are best achieved, by crafting better policies, not by devising new organizational structures or processes. Where appropriate, this report notes those occasions and is not reluctant to suggest new policy directions.

 

Many of the recommendations made herein require legislation to come into being. Many others, however, require only Presidential order or departmental directive. These latter recommendations are not necessarily of lesser importance and can be implemented quickly.

executive orders made prior have paved the way

 

The Commission anticipates that some of its recommendations will win wide support. Other recommendations may generate controversy and even opposition, as is to be expected when dealing with such serious and complex issues. We trust that the ensuing debate will ultimately yield the very best use of this Commission's work for the benefit of the American people.

 

Organizational reform is not a panacea. There is no perfect organizational design, no flawless managerial fix. The reason is that organizations are made up of people, and people invariably devise informal means of dealing with one another in accord with the accidents of personality and temperament. Even excellent organizational structure cannot make impetuous or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor organizational design can make good leaders less effective.

 

Excerpt from "Protocols of the Learned Elders of the Babylonian Talmudic Mystical Qabalah of Zion

6. Political freedom is an idea but not a fact. This idea one must know how to apply whenever it appears necessary with this bait of an idea to attract the masses of the people to one's party for the purpose of crushing another who is in authority. This task is rendered easier of the opponent has himself been infected with the idea of freedom, SO-CALLED LIBERALISM, and, for the sake of an idea, is willing to yield some of his power. It is precisely here that the triumph of our theory appears; the slackened reins of government are immediately, by the law of life, caught up and gathered together by a new hand, because the blind might of the nation cannot for one single day exist without guidance, and the new authority merely fits into the place of the old already weakened by liberalism.

 

Sound organization is important. It can ensure that problems reach their proper level of decision quickly and efficiently and can balance the conflicting imperatives inherent in any national security decision-system-between senior involvement and expert input, between speed and the need to consider a variety of views, between tactical flexibility and strategic consistency. President Eisenhower summarized it best: "Organization cannot make a genius out of a dunce. But it can provide its head with the facts he needs, and help him avoid misinformed mistakes."

 

Most important, good organization helps assure accountability. At every level of organization, elected officials-and particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief-must be

 

able to ascertain quickly and surely who is in charge. But in a government that has expanded through serial incremental adjustment rather than according to an overall plan, finding those responsible to make things go right, or those responsible when things go wrong, can be a very formidable task. This, we may be sure, is not what the Founders had in mind.

 

This Commission has done its best to step up to the mandate of its Charter. It is now up to others to do their best to bring the benefits of this Commission's effort into the institutions of American government.

 

Charles G. Boyd, General, USAF (Ret.)

Executive Director

 

 

Executive Summary

 

After our examination of the new strategic environment of the next quarter century (Phase I) and of a strategy to address it (Phase II), this Commission concludes that significant changes must be made in the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus. Our institutional base is in decline and must be rebuilt. Otherwise, the United States risks losing its global influence and critical leadership role.

 

We offer recommendations for organizational change in five key areas:

 

1 ensuring the security of the American homeland;

 

2 recapitalizing America's strengths in science and education;

 

3 redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch;

 

4 overhauling the U.S. government personnel system; and

 

5 reorganizing Congress's role in national security affairs.

 

We have taken a broad view of national security. In the new era, sharp distinctions between "foreign" and "domestic" no longer apply. ( are Americans now in a class with foreigners?)

We do not equate national security with "defense." We do believe in the centrality of strategy, and of seizing opportunities as well as confronting dangers. If the structures and processes of the U.S. government stand still amid a world of change, the United States will lose its capacity to shape history, and will instead be shaped by it.

 

 

Securing the National Homeland

 

The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.

 

We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.

NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the three organizations currently on the front line of border security-the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol- transferred to it. NHSA would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including information technology.

 

The NHSA Director would have Cabinet status and would be a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. The legal foundation for the National Homeland Security Agency would rest firmly within the array of Constitutional guarantees for civil liberties. The observance of these guarantees in the event of a national security emergency would be safeguarded by NHSA's interagency coordinating activities-which would include the Department of Justice-as well as by its conduct of advance exercises.

This commission report was submitted in Jan. 2001, rejected by the Bush Administration in May, in September two airplanes flew into the trade center towers of New York, immediately thereafter this entire scenario has taken place? Figure this out, after you view my entire site.

 

The potentially catastrophic nature of homeland attacks necessitates our being prepared to use the tremendous resources of the Department of Defense (DoD). Therefore, the department needs to pay far more attention to this mission in the future. We recommend that a new office of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security be created to oversee the various DoD activities and ensure that the necessary resources are made available.

Excerpt from Protocols

14. In any State in which there is a bad organization of authority, an impersonality of laws and of the rulers who have lost their personality amid the flood of rights ever multiplying out of liberalism, I find a new right - to attack by the right of the strong, and to scatter to the winds all existing forces of order and regulation, to reconstruct all institutions and to become the sovereign lord of those who have left to us the rights of their power by laying them down voluntarily in their liberalism.

 

New priorities also need to be set for the U.S. armed forces in light of the threat to the homeland. We urge, in particular, that the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself ordains. The National Guard should be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake that mission.

 

Excerpt from Protocols

16. Out of the temporary evil we are now compelled to commit will emerge the good of an unshakable rule, which will restore the regular course of the machinery of the national life, brought to naught by liberalism. The result justifies the means. Let us, however, in our plans, direct our attention not so much to what is good and moral as to what is necessary and useful.

 

Finally, we recommend that Congress reorganize itself to accommodate this Executive Branch realignment, and that it also form a special select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional support and oversight in this critical area.

Excerpt of Protocols

1. What form of administrative rule can be given to communities in which corruption has penetrated everywhere, communities where riches are attained only by the clever surprise tactics of semi-swindling tricks; where loseness reigns: where morality is maintained by penal measures and harsh laws but not by voluntarily accepted principles: where the feelings towards faith and country are obligated by cosmopolitan convictions? What form of rule is to be given to these communities if not that despotism which I shall describe to you later? We shall create an intensified centralization of government in order to grip in our hands all the forces of the community. We shall regulate mechanically all the actions of the political life of our subjects by new laws. These laws will withdraw one by one all the indulgences and liberties which have been permitted by the GOYIM, and our kingdom will be distinguished by a despotism of such magnificent proportions as to be at any moment and in every place in a position to wipe out any GOYIM who oppose us by deed or word.

 2. This, then, is the program of the new constitution. We shall make Law, Right and Justice (1) in the guise of proposals to the Legislative Corps, (2) by decrees of the president under the guise of general regulations, of orders of the Senate and of resolutions of the State Council in the guise of ministerial orders, (3) and in case a suitable occasion should arise - in the form of a revolution in the State.

 

Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education

 

Americans are living off the economic and security benefits of the last three generations' investment in science and education, but we are now consuming capital. Our systems of basic scientific research and education are in serious crisis, while other countries are redoubling their efforts. In the next quarter century, we will likely see ourselves surpassed, and in relative decline, unless we make a conscious national commitment to maintain our edge.

 

We also face unprecedented opportunity. The world is entering an era of dramatic progress in bioscience and materials science as well as information technology and scientific instrumentation. Brought together and accelerated by nanoscience, these rapidly developing research fields will transform our understanding of the world and our capacity to manipulate it. The United States can remain the world's technological leader if it makes the commitment to do so. But the U.S. government has seriously underfunded basic scientific research in recent years. The quality of the U.S. education system, too, has fallen well behind those of scores of other nations. This has occurred at a time when vastly more Americans will have to understand and work competently with science and math on a daily basis.

 

In this Commission's view, the inadequacies of our systems of research and education pose a greater threat to U.S. national security over the next quarter century than any potential conventional war that we might imagine. American national leadership must understand these deficiencies as threats to national security. If we do not invest heavily and wisely in rebuilding these two core strengths, America will be incapable of maintaining its global position long into the 21st century.

 

We therefore recommend doubling the federal research and development budget by 2010, and instituting a more competitive environment for the allotment of those funds.

Excerpt from Protocols

4. Classicism as also any form of study of ancient history, in which there are more bad than good examples, we shall replace with the study of the program of the future. We shall erase from the memory of men all facts of previous centuries which are undesirable to us, and leave only those which depict all the errors of the government of the GOYIM. The study of practical life, of the obligations of order, of the relations of people one to another, of avoiding bad and selfish examples, which spread the infection of evil, and similar questions of an educative nature, will stand in the forefront of the teaching program, which will be drawn up on a separate plan for each calling or state of life, in no wise generalizing the teaching. This treatment of the question has special importance.

5. Each state of life must be trained within strict limits corresponding to its destination and work in life. The OCCASIONAL GENIUS HAS ALWAYS MANAGED AND ALWAYS WILL MANAGE TO SLIP THROUGH INTO OTHER STATES OF LIFE, BUT IT IS THE MOST PERFECT FOLLY FOR THE SAKE OF THIS RARE OCCASIONAL GENIUS TO LET THROUGH INTO RANKS FOREIGN TO THEM THE UNTALENTED WHO THUS ROB OF THEIR PLACES WHO BELONG TO THOSE RANKS BY BIRTH OR EMPLOYMENT. YOU KNOW YOURSELVES IN WHAT ALL THIS HAS ENDED FOR THE "GOYIM" WHO ALLOWED THIS CRYING ABSURDITY.

6. In order that he who rules may be seated firmly in the hearts and minds of his subjects it is necessary for the time of his activity to instruct the whole nation in the schools and on the market places about this meaning and his acts and all his beneficent initiatives.

7. We shall abolish every kind of freedom of instruction. Learners of all ages have the right to assemble together with their parents in the educational establishments as it were in a club: during these assemblies, on holidays, teachers will read what will pass as free lectures on questions of human relations, of the laws of examples, of the philosophy of new theories not yet declared to the world. These theories will be raised by us to the stage of a dogma of faith as a traditional stage towards our faith. On the completion of this exposition of our program of action in the present and the future I will read you the principles of these theories.

8. In a word, knowing by the experience of many centuries that people live and are guided by ideas, that these ideas are imbibed by people only by the aid of education provided with equal success for all ages of growth, but of course by varying methods, we shall swallow up and confiscate to our own use the last scintilla of independence of thought, which we have for long past been directing towards subjects and ideas useful for us. The system of bridling thought is already at work in the so-called system of teaching by OBJECT LESSONS, the purpose of which is to turn the GOYIM into unthinking submissive brutes waiting for things to be presented before their eyes in order to form an idea of them .... In France, one of our best agents, Bourgeois, has already made public a new program of teaching by object lessons.

 

 

 

We recommend further that the role of the President's Science Advisor be elevated to oversee these and other critical tasks, such as the resuscitation of the national laboratory system and the institution of better inventory stewardship over the nation's science and technology assets.

 

We also recommend a new National Security Science and Technology Education Act to fund a comprehensive program to produce the needed numbers of science and engineering professionals as well as qualified teachers in science and math. This Act should provide loan forgiveness incentives to attract those who have graduated and scholarships for those still in school and should provide these incentives in exchange for a period of K-12 teaching in science and math, or of military or government service. Additional measures should provide resources to modernize laboratories in science education, and expand existing programs aimed at economically-depressed school districts.

 

 

Institutional Redesign

 

The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the Cold War of the last half- century have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the Executive Branch of the U.S. government. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy. Most troublesome is the lack of an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Clear goals and priorities are rarely set. Budgets are prepared and appropriated as they were during the Cold War.

 

The Department of State, in particular, is a crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies, and thereby weakened further. Only if the State Department's internal weaknesses are cured will it become an effective leader in the making and implementation of the nation's foreign policy. Only then can it credibly seek significant funding increases from Congress. The department suffers in particular from an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.

Excerpt from Protocols

1. The State Council has been, as it were, the emphatic expression of the authority of the ruler: it will be, as the "show" part of the Legislative Corps, what may be called the editorial committee of the laws and decrees of the ruler.

 

For this and other reasons, the power to determine national security policy has steadily migrated toward the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The staff now assumes policymaking roles that many observers have warned against. Yet the NSC staff's role as policy coordinator is more urgently needed than ever, given the imperative of integrating the many diverse strands of policymaking.

 

Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence community is adjusting only slowly to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era. While the economic and political components of statecraft have assumed greater prominence, military imperatives still largely drive the analysis and collection of intelligence. Neither has America's overseas presence been properly adapted to the new economic, social, political, and security realities of the 21st century.

 

Finally, the Department of Defense needs to be overhauled. The growth in staff and staff activities has created mounting confusion and delay. The failure to outsource or privatize many defense support activities wastes huge sums of money. The programming and budgeting process is not guided by effective strategic planning. The weapons acquisition process is so hobbled by excessive laws, regulations, and oversight strictures that it can neither recognize nor seize opportunities for major innovation, and its procurement bureaucracy weakens a defense industry that is already in a state of financial crisis.

 

In light of such serious and interwoven deficiencies, the Commission's initial recommendation is that strategy should once again drive the design and implementation of U.S. national security policies. That means that the President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and that process should be linked to the allocation of resources throughout the government. When submitting his budgets for the various national security departments, the President should also present an overall national security budget, focused on the nation's most critical strategic goals. Homeland security, counter- terrorism, and science and technology should be included.

 

We recommend further that the President's National Security Advisor and NSC staff return to their traditional role of coordinating national security activities and resist the temptation to become policymakers or operators. The NSC Advisor should also keep a low public profile. Legislative, press communications, and speech-writing functions should reside in the White House staff, not separately in the NSC staff as they do today. The higher the profile of the National Security Advisor the greater will be the pressures from Congress to compel testimony and force Senate confirmation of the position.

Excerpt from the Protocols

 5. According to strictly enforced outward appearances our ruler will employ his power only for the advantage of the nation and in no wise for his own or dynastic profits. Therefore, with the observance of this decorum, his authority will be respected and guarded by the subjects themselves, it will receive an apotheosis in the admission that with it is bound up the well-being of every citizen of the State, for upon it will depend all order in the common life of the pack ....

 

To reflect how central economics has become in U.S. national security policy, we recommend that the Secretary of Treasury be named a statutory member of the National Security Council. Responsibility for international economic policy should return to the National Security Council. The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council.

 

Excerpt from the Protocols

1. To-day we shall touch upon the financial program, which I put off to the end of my report as being the most difficult, the crowning and the decisive point of our plans. Before entering upon it I will remind you that I have already spoken before by way of a hint when I said that the sum total of our actions is settled by the question of figures.

2. When we come into our kingdom our autocratic government will avoid, from a principle of self-preservation, sensibly burdening the masses of the people with taxes, remembering that it plays the part of father and protector. But as State organization cost dear it is necessary nevertheless to obtain the funds required for it. It will, therefore, elaborate with particular precaution the question of equilibrium in this matter.

3. Our rule, in which the king will enjoy the legal fiction that everything in his State belongs to him (which may easily be translated into fact), will be enabled to resort to the lawful confiscation of all sums of every kind for the regulation of their circulation in the State. From this follows that taxation will best be covered by a progressive tax on property. In this manner the dues will be paid without straitening or ruining anybody in the form of a percentage of the amount of property. The rich must be aware that it is their duty to place a part of their superfluities at the disposal of the State since the State guarantees them security of possession of the rest of their property and the right of honest gains, I say honest, for the control over property will do away with robbery on a legal basis.

Critical to the future success of U.S. national security policies is a fundamental restructuring of the State Department. Reform must ensure that responsibility and accountability are clearly established, regional and functional activities are closely integrated, foreign assistance programs are centrally planned and implemented, and strategic planning is emphasized and linked to the allocation of resources.

Protocols of Satan's minions

15. Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the Chamber the right of interpolation on government measures, on the pretext of preserving political secrecy, and, further, we shall by the new constitution reduce the number of representatives to a minimum, thereby proportionately reducing political passions and the passion for politics. If, however, they should, which is hardly to be expected, burst into flame, even in this minimum, we shall nullify them by a stirring appeal and a reference to the majority of the whole people ... Upon the president will depend the appointment of presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber and the Senate. Instead of constant sessions of Parliaments we shall reduce their sittings to a few months. Moreover, the president, as chief of the executive power, will have the right to summon and dissolve Parliament, and, in the latter case, to prolong the time for the appointment of a new parliamentary assembly. But in order that the consequences of all these acts which in substance are illegal, should not, prematurely for our plans, upon the responsibility established by use of the president, WE SHALL INSTIGATE MINISTERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE HIGHER ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT TO EVADE HIS DISPOSITIONS BY TAKING MEASURES OF THEIR OWN, for doing which they will be made the scapegoats in his place ... This part we especially recommend to be given to be played by the Senate, the Council of State, or the Council of Ministers, but not to an individual official.

 

We recommend that this be accomplished through the creation of five Under Secretaries with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter- America, and Near East/South Asia, and a redefinition of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. The restructuring we propose would position the State Department to play a leadership role in the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, as well as to harness the department's organizational culture to the benefit of the U.S. government as a whole. Perhaps most important, the Secretary of State would be free to focus on the most important policies and negotiations, having delegated responsibility for integrating regional and functional issues to the Under Secretaries.

Protocols of the coming Olam Ha Ba of Moshiach ben Satan

PROTOCOL No. 11

1. The State Council has been, as it were, the emphatic expression of the authority of the ruler: it will be, as the "show" part of the Legislative Corps, what may be called the editorial committee of the laws and decrees of the ruler.

2. This, then, is the program of the new constitution. We shall make Law, Right and Justice (1) in the guise of proposals to the Legislative Corps, (2) by decrees of the president under the guise of general regulations, of orders of the Senate and of resolutions of the State Council in the guise of ministerial orders, (3) and in case a suitable occasion should arise - in the form of a revolution in the State.

3. Having established approximately the MODUS AGENDI we will occupy ourselves with details of those combinations by which we have still to complete the revolution in the course of the machinery of State in the direction already indicated. By these combinations I mean the freedom of the Press, the right of association, freedom of conscience, the voting principle, and many another that must disappear for ever from the memory of man, or undergo a radical alteration the day after the promulgation of the new constitution. It is only at the moment that we shall be able at once to announce all our orders, for, afterwards, every noticeable alteration will be dangerous, for the following reasons: if this alteration be brought in with harsh severity and in a sense of severity and limitations, it may lead to a feeling of despair caused by fear of new alterations in the same direction; if, on the other hand, it be brought in a sense of further indulgences it will be said that we have recognized our own wrong-doing and this will destroy the prestige of the infallibility of our authority, or else it will be said that we have become alarmed and are compelled to show a yielding disposition, for which we shall get no thanks because it will be supposed to be compulsory ... Both the one and the other are injurious to the prestige of the new constitution. What we want is that from the first moment of its promulgation, while the peoples of the world are still stunned by the accomplished fact of the revolution, still in a condition of terror and uncertainty, they should recognize once for all that we are so strong, so inexpugnable, so super-abundantly filled with power, that in no case shall we take any account of them, and so far from paying any attention to their opinions or wishes, we are ready and able to crush with irresistible power all expression or manifestation thereof at every moment and in every place, that we have seized at once everything we wanted and shall in no case divide our power with them ... Then in fear and trembling they will close their eyes to everything, and be content to await what will be the end of it all.

WE ARE WOLVES

 

Accountability would be matched with responsibility in senior policymakers, who in serving the Secretary would be able to speak for the State Department both within the interagency process and before Congress. No longer would competing regional and functional perspectives immobilize the department. At the same time, functional perspectives, whether they be human rights, arms control, or the environment, will not disappear. The Under Secretaries would be clearly accountable to the Secretary of State, the President, and the Congress for ensuring that the appropriate priority was given to these concerns. Someone would actually be in charge.

Protocols of Lackeys of Lucifer

WE ARE WOLVES

4. The GOYIM are a flock of sheep, and we are their wolves. And you know what happens when the wolves get hold of the flock? ....

5. There is another reason also why they will close their eyes: for we shall keep promising them to give back all the liberties we have taken away as soon as we have quelled the enemies of peace and tamed all parties ....

6. It is not worth to say anything about how long a time they will be kept waiting for this return of their liberties ....

7. For what purpose then have we invented this whole policy and insinuated it into the minds of the GOY without giving them any chance to examine its underlying meaning? For what, indeed, if not in order to obtain in a roundabout way what is for our scattered tribe unattainable by the direct road? It is this which has served as the basis for our organization of SECRET MASONRY WHICH IS NOT KNOWN TO, AND AIMS WHICH ARE NOT EVEN SO MUCH AS SUSPECTED BY, THESE "GOY" CATTLE, ATTRACTED BY US INTO THE "SHOW" ARMY OF MASONIC LODGES IN ORDER TO THROW DUST IN THE EYES OF THEIR FELLOWS.

8. God has granted to us, His Chosen People, the gift of the dispersion, and in this which appears in all eyes to be our weakness, has come forth all our strength, which has now brought us to the threshold of sovereignty over all the world.

9. There now remains not much more for us to build up upon the foundation we have laid.

What would this man be in charge of?

What does Texe Marrs say?

The Tribe of Levi

Keep in mind that Chandra's Jewish name, "Levy," comes from the tribe of Levi. In the Bible in Numbers 1:48-51 the Lord spoke to Moses commanding that the Levites be appointed over the tabernacle of God and be ministers. Only the Levitical priests were ordained to offer a holy sacrifice unto the Lord. The Levites kept the law.

Did the notorious men of Satan's Washington, D.C. Illuminati brotherhood endeavor to commit the obscene abomination of sacrificing a young Jewish woman named "Levy" on their high holy day, the day revered in the occult netherworld as the day of Grand Sacrifice? Did Chandra Levy's murder symbolize for them their liberty to be free of God and God's law?

Chandra Levy a Mossad Agent?

An accumulation of evidence indicates that the 24-year old Levy was a youthful recruit of the Israeli Mossad, that nation's premier spy agency. In that capacity, she had served as an intern in the executive offices of California Governor Gray Davis, an Illuminati initiate, and that is where she first met Mr. Condit, also an Illuminati servant.

In Washington, D.C., Ms. Levy not only began a relationship and affair with Gary Condit, she also was introduced to the perverted inner sex lives of numbers of other congressmen, all of whom are part of D.C.'s exclusive satanic brotherhood.

Working at the top level of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the ingenious Chandra was able to obtain highly classified information pertaining to Timothy McVeigh, then awaiting execution in a federal penitentiary. She came upon documents linking McVeigh to a broad, Illuminati-U.S. intelligence operation involving FBI and CIA-sponsored domestic "pseudo terrorists" (McVeigh, Nichols, et. al), Arab Islamic agents, and foreign intelligence services (Germany, Britain, and Israel).

Gary Condit is himself a senior member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, a fact that Chandra Levy used to good advantage in her role as a Mossad agent. Ms. Levy requested Condit obtain for her a position at CIA headquarters, suggesting that if he did not, certain "private things" about Condit's intelligence connections and his grotesquely satanic, sexual misconduct might be made public.

I believe that at that point Chandra Levy had somehow stumbled onto the most shocking intelligence secret of the last few decades—the horrific Illuminati plot to manipulate so-called Arab Islamic terrorists to smash airliners into the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon.

Death in Baphomet's Rock Creek Park

This unauthorized disclosure sealed Chandra Levy's doom. On May 1st, a date numerologically and occultly significant in the Illuminati's witchcraft and satanic calendar, she was disposed of during a ritual at D.C.'s mysteriously gothic Rock Creek Park, a large, forested area which is shaped like a goat's head—the hideous head of Baphomet, the Masonic goat-god, representative of the coming antichrist.

Israeli Spies and Commandos in New York City

According to Ha'aretz, the largest circulation daily newspaper in Israel, on the day the two hijacked aircraft exploded the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, five Israelis were sighted atop a New York Manhattan building. They were working a video camera. This Israeli spy team videotaped the entire terrorist incident from start to finish. Nearby observers who clandestinely saw them were astonished to see the five men shouting joyously and jumping up and down as the explosions ripped the towers and each building collapsed.

These nearby witnesses phoned the NYC police and the FBI. The FBI came and arrested the five, who turned out to be Israelis carrying false visa papers. The Ha'aretz article said the five were stripped of their clothes, incarcerated in dark jail cells, and interrogated nonstop for 13 solid hours by FBI agents. The FBI interrogators accused the five of being Israeli Mossad spy agents.

Their arrest alerted the FBI to the existence of some 200 Israeli "commandos" training at a warehouse in New Jersey. They and the five arrested were "employed" by a bogus moving company owned by an Israeli.

After diplomatic intervention at the highest levels of the Israeli and U.S. governments, the NYC FBI squad was ordered to cease their investigation, release the five suspects, and turn them over to the Israeli Consul. They were immediately flown to Israel.

Did these bizarre events have anything to do with advance intelligence information obtained by Chandra Levy and passed on to Israel prior to her May 1st abduction?

Congressman Gary Condit Promoted by Elite

Our eyes are further opened when we discover what has happened in the past few weeks since September 11th, to the disgraced Congressman Gary Condit. Thought to be on the ropes, his career finished, Condit's Illuminati friends have now come to his rescue.

House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) on September 16 moved to elevate and promote Condit, naming him to sit on the just-created, influential new House Committee on Homeland Defense and Terrorism. Meanwhile, Democratic Party big-wigs, working behind-the-scenes, promised Condit their full support—and all the money he needs—to run for re-election next year.

Amazingly, even though he has been outed to all of America as a vicious, unfeeling, immoral viper, Condit remains the Illuminati's reigning, California "Pretty Boy," if you get my drift.

Excerpt From Protocols

2. The administrators, whom we shall choose from among the public, with strict regard to their capacities for servile obedience, will not be persons trained in the arts of government, and will therefore easily become pawns in our game in the hands of men of learning and genius who will be their advisers, specialists bred and reared from early childhood to rule the affairs of the whole world.

 

We further recommend that the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development be fully integrated into this new State Department organization. Development aid is not an end in itself, nor can it be successful if pursued independently of other U.S. programs and diplomatic activities. Only a coordinated diplomatic and assistance effort will advance the nation's goals abroad, whether they be economic growth, democracy, or human rights.

 

The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the allocation of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office. Rather than multiple Congressional appropriations, the State Department should also be funded in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as the expenses for all related personnel and operations. Also, all U.S. Ambassadors, including the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should report directly to the Secretary of State, and a major effort needs to be undertaken to "right-size" the U.S. overseas presence.

 

The Commission believes that the resulting improvements in the effectiveness and competency of the State Department and its overseas activities would provide the basis for the significant increase in resources necessary to carry out the nation's foreign policy in the 21st century.

Excerpt from the Protocols

 

 

 8. Under various names there exists in all countries approximately one and the same thing. Representation, Ministry, Senate, State Council, Legislative and Executive Corps. I need not explain to you the mechanism of the relation of these institutions to one another, because you are aware of all that; only take note of the fact that each of the above-named institutions corresponds to some important function of the State, and I would beg you to remark that the word "important" I apply not to the institution but to the function, consequently it is not the institutions which are important but their functions. These institutions have divided up among themselves all the functions of government - administrative, legislative, executive, wherefore they have come to operate as do the organs in the human body. If we injure one part in the machinery of State, the State falls sick, like a human body, and ... will die.

 

As for the Department of Defense, resource issues are also very much at stake in reform efforts. The key to success will be direct, sustained involvement and commitment to defense reform on the part of the President, Secretary of Defense, and Congressional leadership. We urge first and foremost that the new Secretary of Defense reduce by ten to fifteen percent the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the regional commands. This would not only save money but also achieve the decision speed and encourage the decentralization necessary to succeed in the 21st century.

 

Just as critical, the Secretary of Defense should establish a ten-year goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20-25 percent through steps to consolidate, restructure, outsource, and privatize as many DoD support agencies and activities as possible. Only through savings in infrastructure costs, which now take up nearly half of DoD's budget, will the department find the funds necessary for modernization and for combat personnel in the long-term.

 

The processes by which the Defense Department develops its programs and budgets as well as acquires its weapons also need fundamental reform. The most critical first step is for the Secretary of Defense to produce defense policy and planning guidance that defines specific goals and establishes relative priorities.

 

Together with the Congress, the Secretary of Defense should move the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the second year of a Presidential term. The current requirement, that it be done in an administration's first year, spites the purpose of the activity. Such a deadline does not allow the time or the means for an incoming administration to influence the QDR outcome, and therefore for it to gain a stake in its conclusions.

 

We recommend a second change in the QDR, as well; namely that the Secretary of Defense introduce a new process that requires the Services and defense agencies to compete for the allocation of some resources within the overall Defense budget. This, we believe, would give the Secretary a vehicle to identify low priority programs and begin the process of reallocating funds to more promising areas during subsequent budget cycles.

 

As for acquisition reform, the Commission is deeply concerned with the downward spiral that has emerged in recent decades in relations between the Pentagon as customer and the defense industrial base as supplier of the nation's major weapons systems. Many innovative high-tech firms are simply unable or unwilling to work with the Defense Department under the weight of its auditing, contracting, profitability, investment, and inspection regulations. These regulations also impair the Defense Department's ability to function with the speed it needs to keep abreast of today's rapid pace of technological innovation. Weapons development cycles average nine years in an environment where technology now changes every twelve to eighteen months in Silicon Valley-and the gap between private sector and defense industry innovation continues to widen.

 

In place of a specialized "defense industrial base," we believe that the nation needs a national industrial base for defense composed of a broad cross-section of commercial firms as well as the more traditional defense firms. "New economy" sectors must be attracted to work with the government on sound business and professional grounds; the more traditional defense suppliers, which fill important needs unavailable in the commercial sector, must be given incentives to innovate and operate efficiently. We therefore recommend these major steps:

 

1 Establish and employ a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a "fast track" for a modest number of potential breakthrough systems, especially those in the area of command and control.

2 Return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of selected weapons and support systems to foster innovation. We should use testing procedures to gain knowledge and not to demonstrate a program's ability to survive budgetary scrutiny.

3 Implement two-year defense budgeting solely for the modernization element (R&D/procurement)of the Defense budget and expand the use of multi-year procurement.

4 Modernize auditing and oversight requirements (by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, Title 10, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations) with a goal of reducing the number of auditors and inspectors in the acquisition system to a level commensurate with the budget they oversee.

Amidst the other process reforms for the Defense Department, the Commission recognizes the need to modernize current force planning methods. We conclude that the concept of two major, coincident wars is a remote possibility supported neither by the main thrust of national intelligence nor by this Commission's view of the likely future. It should be replaced by a planning process that accelerates the transformation of capabilities and forces better suited to, and thus likely to succeed in, the current security environment. The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to shift from the threat-based, force sizing process to one which measures requirements against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security objectives as defined in the new administration's national security strategy-once formulated.

The Commission furthermore recommends that the Secretary of Defense revise the current categories of Major Force Programs (MFPs) used in the Defense Program Review to correspond to the five military capabilities the Commission prescribed in its Phase II report- strategic nuclear forces, homeland security forces, conventional forces, expeditionary forces, and humanitarian and constabulary forces.

 

Ultimately, the transformation process will blur the distinction between expeditionary and conventional forces, as both types of capabilities will eventually possess the technological superiority, deployability, survivability, and lethality now called for in the expeditionary forces. For the near term, however, those we call expeditionary capabilities require the most emphasis. Consequently, we recommend that the Defense Department devote its highest priority to improving and further developing its expeditionary capabilities.

There is no more critical dimension of defense policy than to guarantee U.S. commercial and military access to outer space. The U.S. economy and military are vitally dependent on communications that rely on space. The clear imperative for the new era is a comprehensive national policy toward space and a coherent governmental machinery to carry it out. We therefore recommend the establishment of an Interagency Working Group on Space (IWGS).

 

The members of this interagency working group would include not only the relevant parts of the intelligence community and the State and Defense Departments, but also the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Commerce, and other Executive Branch agencies as necessary.

 

Meanwhile, the global presence and responsibilities of the United States have brought new requirements for protecting U.S. space and communications infrastructures, but no comprehensive national space architecture has been developed. We recommend that such responsibility be given to the new interagency space working group and that the existing National Security Space Architect be transferred from the Defense Department to the NSC staff to take the lead in this effort.

 

The Commission has concluded that the basic structure of the intelligence community does not require change. Our focus is on those steps that will enable the full implementation of recommendations found elsewhere within this report.

 

First in this regard, we recommend that the President order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence.

 

Second, the intelligence community should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the intelligence community's highest priorities, and ensure that existing operational guidelines support this policy.

 

Third, the community should place new emphasis on collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security concerns, and incorporate more open source intelligence into its analytical products. To facilitate this effort, Congress should increase significantly the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and analysis.

The Human Requirements for National Security

 

As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government. The declining orientation toward government service as a prestigious career is deeply troubling. Both civilian and military institutions face growing challenges, albeit of different forms and degrees, in recruiting and retaining America's most promising talent. This problem derives from multiple sources-ample private sector opportunities with good pay and fewer bureaucratic frustrations, rigid governmental personnel procedures, the absence of a single overarching threat like the Cold War to entice service, cynicism about the worthiness of government service, and perceptions of government as a plodding bureaucracy falling behind in a technological age of speed and accuracy.

 Excerpt from the Protocols

15. Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the Chamber the right of interpolation on government measures, on the pretext of preserving political secrecy, and, further, we shall by the new constitution reduce the number of representatives to a minimum, thereby proportionately reducing political passions and the passion for politics. If, however, they should, which is hardly to be expected, burst into flame, even in this minimum, we shall nullify them by a stirring appeal and a reference to the majority of the whole people ... Upon the president will depend the appointment of presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber and the Senate. Instead of constant sessions of Parliaments we shall reduce their sittings to a few months. Moreover, the president, as chief of the executive power, will have the right to summon and dissolve Parliament, and, in the latter case, to prolong the time for the appointment of a new parliamentary assembly. But in order that the consequences of all these acts which in substance are illegal, should not, prematurely for our plans, upon the responsibility established by use of the president, WE SHALL INSTIGATE MINISTERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE HIGHER ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT TO EVADE HIS DISPOSITIONS BY TAKING MEASURES OF THEIR OWN, for doing which they will be made the scapegoats in his place ... This part we especially recommend to be given to be played by the Senate, the Council of State, or the Council of Ministers, but not to an individual official.

16. The president will, at our discretion, interpret the sense of such of the existing laws as admit of various interpretation; he will further annul them when we indicate to him the necessity to do so, besides this, he will have the right to propose temporary laws, and even new departures in the government constitutional working, the pretext both for the one and the other being the requirements for the supreme welfare of the State.

These factors are adversely affecting recruitment and retention in the Civil and Foreign Services and particularly throughout the military, where deficiencies are both widening the gap between those who serve and the rest of American society and putting in jeopardy the leadership and professionalism necessary for an effective military. If we allow the human resources of government to continue to decay, none of the reforms proposed by this or any other national security commission will produce their intended results.

 

Excerpt from the Protocols

 

 

18. The recognition of our despot may also come before the destruction of the constitution; the moment for this recognition will come when the peoples, utterly wearied by the irregularities and incompetence - a matter which we shall arrange for - of their rulers, will clamor: "Away with them and give us one king over all the earth who will unite us and annihilate the causes of disorders - frontiers, nationalities, religions, State debts - who will give us peace and quiet which we cannot find under our rulers and representatives."

 

We recommend, first of all, a national campaign to reinvigorate and enhance the prestige of service to the nation. The key step in such a campaign must be to revive a positive attitude toward public service. This will require strong and consistent Presidential commitment, Congressional legislation, and innovative departmental actions throughout the federal government. It is the duty of all political leaders to repair the damage that has been done, in a high-profile and fully bipartisan manner.

 

From these changes in rhetoric, the campaign must undertake several actions. First, this Commission recommends the most urgent possible streamlining of the process by which we attract senior government officials. The ordeal that Presidential nominees are subjected to is now so great as to make it prohibitive for many individuals of talent and experience to accept public service. The confirmation process is characterized by vast amounts of paperwork and many delays. Conflict of interest and financial disclosure requirements have become a prohibitive obstacle to the recruitment of honest men and women to public service. Post-employment restrictions confront potential new recruits with the prospect of having to forsake not only income but work itself in the very fields in which they have demonstrated talent and found success. Meanwhile, a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and cynicism about government service is reinforced by the encrustation of complex rules based on the assumption that all officials, and especially those with experience in or contact with the private sector, are criminals waiting to be unmasked.

 

We therefore recommend the following:

1 That the President act to shorten and make more efficient the Presidential appointee process by confirming the national security team first, standardizing paperwork requirements, and reducing the number of nominees subject to full FBI background checks.

2 That the President reduce the number of Senate-confirmed and non-career SES positions by 25 percent to reduce the layering of senior positions in departments that has developed over time.

3 That the President and Congressional leaders instruct their top aides to report within 90 days of January 20, 2001 on specific steps to revise government ethics laws and regulations.

see Noachide Laws HJR Public Law 102-14, establishing ethics under Zion

 

Excerpt from Protocols

21. It is only with a despotic ruler that plans can be elaborated extensively and clearly in such a way as to distribute the whole properly among the several parts of the machinery of the State: from this the conclusion is inevitable that a satisfactory form of government for any country is one that concentrates in the hands of one responsible person. Without an absolute despotism there can be no existence for civilization which is carried on not by the masses but by their guide, whosoever that person may be. The mob is savage, and displays its savagery at every opportunity. The moment the mob seizes freedom in its hands it quickly turns to anarchy, which in itself is the highest degree of savagery.

 

2. The administrators, whom we shall choose from among the public, with strict regard to their capacities for servile obedience, will not be persons trained in the arts of government, and will therefore easily become pawns in our game in the hands of men of learning and genius who will be their advisers, specialists bred and reared from early childhood to rule the affairs of the whole world.

 

 

 This should entail a comprehensive review of regulations that might exceed statutory requirements and making blind trusts, discretionary waivers, and recusals more easily available as alternatives to complete divestiture of financial and business holdings of concern.

Beyond the appointments process, there are problems with government personnel systems specific to the Foreign Service, the Civil Service, and to the military services. But for all three, there is one step we urge: Expand the National Security Education Act of 1991 (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for civilian government and military service.

 

This expanded Act is the complement to the National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) and would provide college scholarship and loan forgiveness benefits for government service. Recipients could fulfill this service in a variety of ways: in the active duty military; in National Guard or Reserve units; in national security departments of the Civil Service; or in the Foreign Service. The expanded NSEA thus would provide an important means of recruiting high-quality people into military and civilian government service.

 

An effective and motivated Foreign Service is critical to the success of the Commission's restructuring proposal for the State Department, yet 25 percent fewer people are now taking the entrance exam compared to the mid-1980s. Those who do enter complain of poor management and inadequate professional education. We therefore recommend that the Foreign Service system be improved by making leadership a core value of the State Department, revamping the examination process, and dramatically improving the level of on-going professional education.

Excerpt from the "Protocols"

15. Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the Chamber the right of interpolation on government measures, on the pretext of preserving political secrecy, and, further, we shall by the new constitution reduce the number of representatives to a minimum, thereby proportionately reducing political passions and the passion for politics. If, however, they should, which is hardly to be expected, burst into flame, even in this minimum, we shall nullify them by a stirring appeal and a reference to the majority of the whole people ... Upon the president will depend the appointment of presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber and the Senate. Instead of constant sessions of Parliaments we shall reduce their sittings to a few months. Moreover, the president, as chief of the executive power, will have the right to summon and dissolve Parliament, and, in the latter case, to prolong the time for the appointment of a new parliamentary assembly. But in order that the consequences of all these acts which in substance are illegal, should not, prematurely for our plans, upon the responsibility established by use of the president, WE SHALL INSTIGATE MINISTERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE HIGHER ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT TO EVADE HIS DISPOSITIONS BY TAKING MEASURES OF THEIR OWN, for doing which they will be made the scapegoats in his place ... This part we especially recommend to be given to be played by the Senate, the Council of State, or the Council of Ministers, but not to an individual official.

16. The president will, at our discretion, interpret the sense of such of the existing laws as admit of various interpretation; he will further annul them when we indicate to him the necessity to do so, besides this, he will have the right to propose temporary laws, and even new departures in the government constitutional working, the pretext both for the one and the other being the requirements for the supreme welfare of the State.

 

The Civil Service faces a range of problems from the aging of the federal workforce to institutional challenges in bringing new workers into government service to critical gaps in recruiting and retaining information technology professionals. To address these problems, the Commission recommends eliminating recruitment hurdles, making the hiring process faster and easier, and designing professional education and retention programs worthy of full funding by Congress. Retaining talented information technology workers, too, will require greater incentives and the outsourcing of some IT support functions.

 

The national security component of the Civil Service calls for professionals with breadth of experience in the inter-agency process and with depth of knowledge about policy issues. To develop these, we recommend the establishment of a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to broaden the experience base of senior departmental managers and develop leaders who seek integrative solutions to national security policy problems. Participating departments would include Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy, and the new National Homeland Security Agency-the departments essential to interagency policymaking on key national security issues. While participating departments would retain control over their personnel, an interagency advisory group would design and monitor the rotational assignments and professional education that will be key to the Corps' success.

 

With respect to military personnel, reform is needed in the recruitment, promotion, compensation and retirement systems. Otherwise, the military will continue to lose its most talented personnel, and the armed services will be left with a cadre unable to handle the technological and managerial tasks necessary for a world-class 21st century force.

 

Beyond the significant expansion of scholarships and debt relief programs recommended in both the modified National Security Education Act and the newly created National Security Science and Technology Education Act, we recommend substantial enhancements to the Montgomery GI Bill and strengthening recently passed and pending legislation that supports benefits-including transition, medical, and homeownership-for qualified veterans. The GI Bill should be restored as a pure entitlement, be transferable to dependents if desired by career service members, and should equal, at the very least, the median tuition cost of four-year U.S. colleges. The payments should be accelerated to coincide with school term periods and be indexed to keep pace with college cost increases. In addition, Title 38 authority for veterans benefits should be modified to restore and substantially improve medical, dental, and VA home ownership benefits for all who qualify, but especially for career and retired service members. Taken as a package, such changes will help bring the best people into the armed service and persuade quality personnel to serve longer in order to secure greater rewards for their service.

 

While these enhancements are critical they will not, by themselves, resolve the quality recruitment and retention problems of the Services. We therefore recommend significant modifications to military personnel legislation governing officer and enlisted career management, retirement, and compensation-giving Service Secretaries more authority and flexibility to adapt their personnel systems and career management to meet 21st century requirements. This should include flexible compensation and retirement plans, exemption from "up-or-out" mandates, and reform of personnel systems to facilitate fluid movement of personnel. If we do not decentralize and modernize the governing personnel legislation, no military reform or transformation is possible. We call for an Executive-Legislative working group to monitor, evaluate and share information about the testing and implementation of these recommendations. With bipartisan cooperation, our military will remain one of this nation's most treasured institutions and our safeguard in the changing world ahead.

 

The Role of Congress

 

While Congress has mandated many changes to a host of Executive departments and agencies over the years, it has not fundamentally reviewed its own role in national security policy. Moreover, it has not reformed its own structure since 1949. At present, for example, every major defense program must be voted upon no fewer than eighteen times each year by an array of committees and subcommittees. This represents a very poor use of time for busy members of the Executive and Legislative Branches.

 

To address these deficiencies, the Commission first recommends that the Congressional leadership conduct a thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch's relationship to national security and foreign policy. The House Speaker, Majority, and Minority leaders and the Senate Majority and Minority leaders must work with the President and his top aides to bring proposed reforms to this Congress by the beginning of its second session.

 

From that basis, Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must build programs to encourage members to acquire knowledge and experience in national security. These programs should include ongoing education, greater opportunities for serious overseas travel, more legislature-to-legislature exchanges, and greater participation in wargames.

 

Greater fluency in national security matters must be matched by structural reforms. A comprehensive review of the Congressional committee structure is needed to ensure that it reflects the complexity of 21st century security challenges and of U.S. national security priorities. Specifically we recommend merging appropriations subcommittees with their respective authorizing committees so that the new merged committees will authorize and appropriate within the same bill. This should decrease the bureaucracy of the budget process and allow more time to be devoted to the oversight of national security policy.

 

An effective Congressional role in national security also requires ongoing Executive- Legislative consultation and coordination. The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained effort in consultation and devote resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher priority, in part by forming a permanent consultative group composed of the Congressional leadership and the Chairpersons and Ranking Members of the main committees involved in national security. This will form the basis for sustained dialogue and greater support in times of crisis.

 

The Commission notes, in conclusion, that some of its recommendations will save money, while others call for more expenditure. We have not tried to "balance the books" among our recommendations, nor have we held financial implications foremost in mind during our work. We consider any money that may be saved a second-order benefit. We consider the provision of additional resources to national security, where necessary, to be investments, not costs, in first-order national priorities.

 

Finally, we strongly urge the new President and the Congressional leadership to establish some mechanism to oversee the implementation of the recommendations proffered here. Once some mechanism is chosen, the President must ensure that responsibility for implementing the recommendations of this Commission be given explicitly to senior personnel in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. The press of daily obligations is such that unless such delegation is made, and those given responsibility for implementation are held accountable for their tasks, the necessary reforms will not occur. The stakes are high. We of this Commission believe that many thousands of American lives, U.S. leadership among the community of nations, and the fate of U.S. national security itself are at risk unless the President and the Congress join together to implement the recommendations set forth in this report.

Wonder Why?

Introduction: Imperative for Change

 

The U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century was chartered to be the most comprehensive examination of the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus since the core legislation governing it was passed in 1947. The Commission's Charter enjoins the Commissioners to "propose measures to adapt existing national security structures" to new circumstances, and if necessary, "to create new structures where none exist." The Commission is also charged with providing "cost and time estimates to complete these improvements," as appropriate, for what is to be, in sum, "an institutional road map for the early part of the 21st century."*5

 

Our Phase III report provides such a road map. But Phase III rests on the first two phases of the Commission's work: Phase I's examination of how the world may evolve over the next quarter century, and Phase II's strategy to deal effectively with that world on behalf of American interests and values.

 

In its Phase I effort, this Commission stressed that global trends in scientific- technological, economic, socio-political, and military-security domains-as they mutually interact over the next 25 years-will produce fundamental qualitative changes in the U.S. national security environment. We arrived at these fourteen conclusions:

 

· The United States will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the America homeland, and U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us.

 

· Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities for U.S. security.

 

· New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together.

 

· The national security of all advanced states will be increasingly affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure.

 

· Energy supplies will continue to have major strategic significance.

 

· All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some will break.

 

· The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure as the main principle of international political organization. ("One World Order")

 

· The fragmentation and failure of some states will occur, with destabilizing effects on entire regions.

 

· Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.

 

· Space will become a critical and competitive military environment.

 

· The essence of war will not change.

 

· U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, and even excellent intelligence will not prevent all surprises.

 

· The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances, and with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces.

 

· The emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different U.S. military and other national capabilities.

The Commission's stress on communicating the scale and pace of change has been borne out by extraordinary developments in science and technology in just the eighteen-month period since the Phase I report appeared. The mapping of the human genome was completed. A functioning quantum computing device was invented. Organic and inorganic material was mated at the molecular level for the first time. Basic mechanisms of the aging process have been understood at the genetic level. Any one of these developments would have qualified as a "breakthrough of the decade" a quarter century ago, but they all happened within the past year and a half.

 

This suggests the possible advent of a period of change the scale of which will often astound us. The key factor driving change in America's national security environment over the next 25 years will be the acceleration of scientific discovery and its technological applications, and the uneven human social and psychological capacity to harness them. Synergistic developments in information technology, materials science, biotechnology, and nanotechnology will almost certainly transform human tools more dramatically and rapidly than at any time in human history.

 

While it is easy to underestimate the social implications of change on such a scale, the need for human intellectual and social adaptation imposes limits to the pace of change. These limits are healthy, for they allow and encourage the application of the human moral sense to choices of major import. We will surely have our hands full with such choices over the next quarter century. In that time we may witness the development of a capacity to guide or control evolution by manipulating human DNA. 

The ability to join organic and inorganic material forms suggests, that humans may co-evolve literally with their own machines. 

Resistance is futile, you will be assimilated into the collective.

 

Such prospects are both sobering and contentious. Some look to the future with great hope for the prospect of curing disease, repairing broken bodies, ending poverty, and preserving the biosphere. But others worry that curiosity and vanity will outrun the human moral sense, thus turning hope into disaster. The truth is that we do not know where the rapidly expanding domain of scientific-technological innovation will bring us. Nor do we know the extent to which we can summon the collective moral fortitude to control its outcome.

 

What we do know is that some societies, and some people within societies, will be at the forefront of future scientific- technological developments and others will be marginal to them. This means more polarization between those with wealth and power and those without-both among and within societies. It suggests, as well, that many engrained social patterns will become unstable, for scientific-technological innovation has profound, if generally unintended, effects on economic organization, social values, and political life.

 

In the Internet age, for example, information technologies may be used to empower communities and advance freedoms, but they can also empower political movements led by charismatic leaders with irrational premises. Such men and women in the 21st century will be less bound than those of the 20th by the limits of the state, and less obliged to gain large industrial capabilities in order to wreck havoc.(I wonder if this is reference to me?)

 

But I am no terrorist

 

 For example, a few people with as little as $50,000 investment may manage to produce and spread a genetically-altered pathogen with the potential to kill millions of people in a matter of months. Clearly, the threshold for small groups or even individuals to inflict massive damage on those they take to be their enemies is falling dramatically.

Excerpt from "Protocols"

17. Before us is a plan in which is laid down strategically the line from which we cannot deviate without running the risk of seeing the labor of many centuries brought to naught.

 

As for political life, it is clear that the rapidity of change is already overwhelming many states in what used to be called the Third World. Overlaid on the enduring plagues of corruption and sheer bad government is a new pattern: information technology has widened the awareness of democracy and market-driven prosperity, and has led to increasing symbolic and material demands on government. These demands often exceed existing organizational capacities to meet them. One result is that many national armies do not respond to government control. Another is that mercenaries, criminals, terrorists, and drug cartel operators roam widely and freely. Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) along with global financial institutions sometimes function as proxy service and regulatory bureaucracies to do for states that which they cannot do for themselves-further diminishing governmental control and political accountability.

It is called Technocracy.

 

As a result of the growing porosity of borders, and of the widening scope of functional economic integration, significant political developments can no longer be managed solely through the vehicle of bilateral diplomatic relations. A seemingly internal crisis in Sierra Leone, carefully observed, implicates most of West Africa. A problem involving drug cultivation and political rebellion in Colombia cannot be addressed without involving Panama, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Mexico. Financial problems in Thailand tumble willy-nilly onto Russia, Brazil, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the United States.

Excerpt from the 105 year old controversial "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion" Known to me as the "Protocols of the Learned Elders of the Babylonian Talmudic Mystical Qabalah of Zion" Satans Holy Book

8. Whether a State exhausts itself in its own convulsions, whether its internal discord brings it under the power of external foes - in any case it can be accounted irretrievable lost: IT IS IN OUR POWER. The despotism of Capital, which is entirely in our hands, reaches out to it a straw that the State, willy-nilly, must take hold of: if not - it goes to the bottom.

Miriam Webster Dictionary

Favorite Illuminati by-word, Willy-Nilly

Demography is another major driver of global political change. Population growth tends to moderate with increased literacy, urbanization, and especially changes in traditional values that attend the movement of women into the workplace. Thanks to these trends, the world's rate of population increase is slowing somewhat, but the absolute increases over the next quarter century will be enormous and coping with them will be a major challenge throughout much of the world. In some countries, however, the problem will be too few births. In Japan and Germany, for example, social security and private pension systems may face enormous strain because too few young workers will be available to support retirees living ever-longer lives. The use of foreign workers may be the only recourse for such societies, but that raises other political and social difficulties.

 

Yet another driver of change may be sustained economic growth in particular parts of the world. Asia may well be the most economically dynamic region on earth by 2025. Much depends on China's ability to reform further the structure of its economy and on India's ability to unleash its vast economic potential. But if these two very large countries achieve sustained economic growth-and if the economies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam also grow-the focus of world power will shift away from the dominant Western centers of the past five centuries. While America is itself increasingly diverse, it still shares more philosophically and historically with Europe than with Asia. The challenge for the United States, then, may rest not only in a geostrategic shift, but in a shift in the cultural fabric of international politics itself.

In Phase II the Commission moved from describing objective conditions to prescribing a strategy for dealing with them. Subtitled A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, the Commission stressed that America cannot secure and advance its own interests in isolation. The nations of the world must work together-and the United States must learn to work with others in new ways-if the more cooperative order emerging from the Cold War epoch is to be sustained and strengthened.

Remember the accusations from the global consensus that George W. Bush was an isolationist? That all had to change or else

 

Nonetheless, this Commission takes as its premise that America must play a special international role well into the future. By dint of its power and its wealth, its interests and its values, the United States has a responsibility to itself and to others to reinforce international order. Only the United States can provide the ballast of global stability, and usually the United States is the only country in a position to organize collective responses to common challenges.

We must bomb those who oppose, into submission to the New World Order

 

We believe that American strategy must compose a balance between two key aims. The first is to reap the benefits of a more integrated world in order to expand freedom, security, and prosperity for Americans and for others. But second, American strategy must also strive to dampen the forces of global instability so that those benefits can endure and spread.

 

On the positive side, this means that the United States should pursue, within the limits of what is prudent and realistic, the worldwide expansion of material abundance and the eradication of poverty. It should also promote political pluralism, freedom of thought and speech, and individual liberty. Not only do such aims inhere in American principles, they are practical goals, as well. There are no guarantees against violence and evil in the world. We believe, nonetheless, that the expansion of human rights and basic material well-being constitutes a sturdy bulwark against them. On the negative side, these goals require concerted protection against four related dangers: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism; major interstate aggression; and the collapse of states into internal violence, with the associated regional destabilization that often accompanies it.

 

These goals compose the lodestone of a U.S. strategy to expand freedom and maintain underlying stability, but, as we have said, the United States cannot achieve them by itself. American leadership must be prepared to act unilaterally if necessary, not least because the will to act alone is sometimes required to gain the cooperation of others. But U.S. policy should join its efforts with allies and multilateral institutions wherever possible; the United States is wise to strengthen its partners and in turn will derive strength from them.

Allied bombing into submission of those who oppose

 

The United States, therefore, as the prime keeper of the international security commons, must speak and act in ways that lead others, by dint of their own interests, to ally with American goals. If it is too arrogant and self-possessed, American behavior will invariably stimulate the rise of opposing coalitions. The United States will thereby drive away many of its partners and weaken those that remain. Tone matters.

 

To carry out this strategy and achieve these goals, the Commission defined six key objectives for U.S. foreign and national security policy:

First, the preeminent objective is "to defend the United States and ensure that it is safe from the dangers of a new era.

" The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. 

Keep in mind that this commission report was rejected May 2001

Twin Trade Center was felled in September 11, 2001

Homeland Security, as per this commissions recommendation was adopted by George W. Bush

 

To deter attack against the homeland in the 21st century, the United States requires a new triad of prevention, (Is this similar to George W. Bush at the winning of the United States Presidency and Cheney, vice president and Ashcroft to his cabinet, he made the statement, "The Iron Triangle is now complete.")

 protection, and response. Failure to prevent mass-casualty attacks against the American homeland would jeopardize not only American lives but U.S. foreign policy writ large. 

(We must institute the recommendations set forth or else! ?)

Remember we have yet to come to the full plot of why "Homeland Security" is needed and further recommendations.

 

It would undermine support for U.S. international leadership and for many of our personal freedoms, as well. Indeed, the abrupt undermining of U.S. power and prestige is the worst thing that could happen to the structure of global peace in the next quarter century, and nothing is more likely to produce it than devastating attacks on American soil.

For the sake of our freedom of the world, we must destroy American Civil Liberty?

 

Achieving this goal, and the nation's other critical national security goals, also requires the U.S. government, as a second key objective, to "maintain America's social cohesion, economic competitiveness, technological ingenuity, and military strength." That means a larger investment in and better management of science and technology in government and in society, and a substantially better educational system, particularly for the teaching of science and mathematics.

 

The United States must also take better advantage of the opportunities that the present period of relative international stability and American power enable. A third key objective, therefore, is "to assist the integration of key major powers, especially China, Russia, and India, into the mainstream of the emerging international system.

Haven't we already done this with the disclosure of Military secrets by the Clinton Administration?

 

" Moreover, since globalization's opportunities are rooted in economic and political progress, the Commission's fourth key U.S. objective is "to promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global economy and improve the effectiveness of international institutions and international law."

Great Sanhedrin, International Court of Justice, International monetary or cashless system?

 

A fifth key objective also follows, which is "to adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era in which America's partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility." A sixth and final key objective inheres in an effort "to help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change." While the prospect of major war is low, much of the planet will experience conflict and violence. Unless the United States, in concert with others, can find a way to limit that conflict and violence, it will not be able to construct a foreign policy agenda focussed on opportunities.

We will become the World's Dictator? We must have a war on terrorism. Problem is, who are the true terrorist?

 

Achieving all of these objectives will require a basic shift in orientation: to focus on preventing rather than simply responding to dangers and crises. The United States must redirect its energies, adjust its diplomacy, and redesign its military capabilities to ward off cross-border aggression, assist states before they fail, and avert systemic international financial crises. To succeed over the long run with a preventive focus, the United States needs to institutionalize its efforts to grasp the opportunities the international environment now offers.

Do you understand why the Moslem's are rejecting this "One World Order"?

 

An opportunity-based strategy also has the merit of being more economical than a reactive one. Preventing a financial crisis, even if it involves well-timed bailouts, (will they bailout your company?) is cheaper than recuperating from stock market crashes and regional recessions. Preventing a violent conflict costs less than responsive peacekeeping operations and nation-building activities. And certainly, preventing mass-casualty attacks on the American homeland will be far less expensive than recovering from them.(this is true)

Sounds like black mail all the way around doesn't it?

 

These six objectives, and the Commission's strategy itself, rest on a premise so basic that it often goes unstated: democracy conduces generally to domestic and international peace, and peace conduces to, or at least allows, democratic politics. While this premise is not a "law," and while scholars continue to study and debate these matters, we believe they are strong tendencies, and that they can be strengthened further by a consistent and determined national policy. We know, that a world characterized by the spread of genuine democracy would not be flawless, nor signal "the end of history." But it is the best of all possible worlds that we can conceive, and that we can achieve.

Social Democracy? No Republic?

 

In Phase I, this Commission presented four "Worlds in Prospect," agglomerations of basic trends that, we believed, might describe the world in 2025. The Democratic Peace was one. Nationalism and Protectionism was a second, Division and Mayhem a third, and Globalism Triumphant the fourth. We, and presumably most observers, see the Democratic Peace as a positive future, Nationalism and Protectionism as a step in the wrong direction,  Division and Mayhem as full-fledged tragedy. But the Globalism Triumphant (kiss your individual freedoms as an American citizen goodbye)scenario divides opinion, partly because it is the hardest to envision, and partly because it functions as a template for the projection of conflicting political views.

Rv:13:1: And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy.

Rv:13:2: And the beast which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his feet were as the feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion: and the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great authority.

Rv:13:3: And I saw one of his heads as it were wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed: and all the world wondered after the beast.

Rv:13:4: And they worshipped the dragon which gave power unto the beast: and they worshipped the beast, saying, Who is like unto the beast? who is able to make war with him?

 

Some observers, for example, believe that the end of the nation-state is upon us, and that this is a good thing, for, in this view, nationalism is the root of racism and militarism. The eclipse of the national territorial state is at any rate, some argue, an inevitable development given the very nature of an increasingly integrated world.

Excerpt From "Protocols"

4. WHEN WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED OUR COUP D'ETAT WE SHALL SAY THEN TO THE VARIOUS PEOPLES: "EVERYTHING HAS GONE TERRIBLY BADLY, ALL HAVE BEEN WORN OUT WITH SUFFERING. WE ARE DESTROYING THE CAUSES OF YOUR TORMENT - NATIONALITIES, FRONTIERS, DIFFERENCES OF COINAGES. YOU ARE AT LIBERTY, OF COURSE, TO PRONOUNCE SENTENCE UPON US, BUT CAN IT POSSIBLY BE A JUST ONE IF IT IS CONFIRMED BY YOU BEFORE YOU MAKE ANY TRIAL OF WHAT WE ARE OFFERING YOU." ... THEN WILL THE MOB EXALT US AND BEAR US UP IN THEIR HANDS IN A UNANIMOUS TRIUMPH OF HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS. VOTING, WHICH WE HAVE MADE THE INSTRUMENT WHICH WILL SET US ON THE THRONE OF THE WORLD BY TEACHING EVEN THE VERY SMALLEST UNITS OF MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RACE TO VOTE BY MEANS OF MEETINGS AND AGREEMENTS BY GROUPS, WILL THEN HAVE SERVED ITS PURPOSES AND WILL PLAY ITS PART THEN FOR THE LAST TIME BY A UNANIMITY OF DESIRE TO MAKE CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE WITH US BEFORE CONDEMNING US.

 

 

We demur. To the extent that a more integrated world economically is the best way to raise people out of poverty and disease, we applaud it. We also recognize the need for unprecedented international cooperation on a range of transnational problems. But the state is the only venue discovered so far in which democratic principles and processes can play out reliably, and not all forms of nationalism have been or need be illiberal. We therefore affirm the value of American sovereignty as well as the political and cultural diversity ensured by the present state system. Within that system the United States must live by and be ready to share its political values-but it must remember that those values include tolerance for those who hold different views.

 

A broader and deeper Democratic Peace is, and ought to be, America's aspiration, but there are obstacles to achieving it. Indeed, despite the likely progress ahead on many fronts, the United States may face not only episodic problems but also genuine crises. If the United States mismanages its current global position, it could generate resentments and jealousies that leave us more isolated than isolationist. Major wars involving weapons of mass destruction are possible, and the general security environment may deteriorate faster than the United States, even with allied aid, can redress it. Environmental, economic, and political unraveling in much of the world could occur on a scale so large as to make current levels of prosperity unsustainable, let alone expandable. Certain technologies-biotechnology, for example-may also undermine social and political stability among and within advanced countries, including the United States. Indeed, all these crises may occur, and each could reinforce and deepen the others. (If you do not accept this reports recommendations?) Black mail?

 

The challenge for the United States is to seize the new century's many opportunities and avoid its many dangers. The problem is that the current structures and processes of U.S. national security policymaking are incapable of such management. That is because, just below the enormous power and prestige of the United States today is a neglected and, in some cases, a decaying institutional base.

Excerpt from "Protocols"

10. Liberalism produced Constitutional States, which took the place of what was the only safeguard of the GOYIM, namely, Despotism; and A CONSTITUTION, AS YOU WELL KNOW, IS NOTHING ELSE BUT A SCHOOL OF DISCORDS, misunderstandings, quarrels, disagreements, fruitless party agitations, party whims - in a word, a school of everything that serves to destroy the personality of State activity. THE TRIBUNE OF THE "TALKERICS" HAS, NO LESS EFFECTIVELY THAN THE PRESS, CONDEMNED THE RULERS TO INACTIVITY AND IMPOTENCE, and thereby rendered them useless and superfluous, for which reason indeed they have been in many countries deposed. THEN IT WAS THAT THE ERA OF REPUBLICS BECOME POSSIBLE OF REALIZATION; AND THEN IT WAS THAT WE REPLACED THE RULER BY A CARICATURE OF A GOVERNMENT - BY A PRESIDENT, TAKEN FROM THE MOB, FROM THE MIDST OF OUR PUPPET CREATURES, OR SLAVES. This was the foundation of the mine which we have laid under the GOY people, I should rather say, under the GOY peoples.

 

The U.S. government is not well organized, for example, to ensure homeland security. (Keep in mind this report was released long before the WTC terror) No adequate coordination mechanism exists among federal, state, and local government efforts, as well as those of dozens of agencies at the federal level. If present trends continue in elementary and secondary school science and mathematics education, to take another example, the United States may lose its lead in many, if not most, major areas of critical scientific-technological competence within 25 years. We are also losing, and are finding ourselves unable to replace, the most critical asset we have: talented and dedicated personnel throughout government.

 

Strategic planning is absent in the U.S. government and its budget processes are so inflexible that few resources are available for preventive policies or for responding to crises, nor can resources be reallocated efficiently to reflect changes in policy priorities. The economic component of U.S. national security policy is poorly integrated with the military and diplomatic components. The State Department is demoralized and dysfunctional. The Defense Department appears incapable of generating a strategic posture very different from that of the Cold War, and its weapons acquisition process is slow, inefficient, and burdened by excess regulation. National policy in the increasingly critical environment of space is adrift, and the intelligence community is only slowly reorienting itself to a world of more diffuse and differently shaped threats. The Executive Branch, with the aid of the Congress, needs to initiate change in many areas by taking bold new steps, and by speeding up positive change where it is languishing.

Note: the Executive with the help of Congress, and not we the people through our elected representatives.

 

The very mention of changing the engrained routines and structures of government is usually enough to evoke cynicism even in a born optimist. But the American case is surprisingly positive, especially in relatively recent times. The reorganizations occasioned by World War II were vast and innovative, and the 1947 National Security Act was bold in advancing and institutionalizing them. Major revisions of the 1947 Act were passed subsequently by Congress in 1949, 1953, and 1958. Major internal Defense Department reforms were promulgated as well, one in 1961 and another, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols) in 1986. The essence of the American genius is that we know better than most societies how to reinvent ourselves to meet the times. This Commission, we believe, is true to that estimable tradition. 

(All we need do is insure that countless lives are destroyed and then we move to re-invent?)

 

Despite this relatively good record, resistance will arise to changing U.S. national security structures and processes, both within agencies of government and in the Congress. What is needed, therefore, is for the new administration, together with the new Congress, to exert real leadership.(Despotism?) Our comprehensive recommendations to guide that leadership follow.

 

First, we must prepare ourselves better to defend the national homeland. (Before we dictate the rest of the world?)We take this up in Section I, Securing the National Homeland. We put this first because it addresses the most dangerous and the most novel threat to American national security in the years ahead.

WTC forced this recommendation. Wake up people.

 

Second, we must rebuild our strengths in the generation and management of science and technology and in education. We have made Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education the second section of this report despite the fact that science management and education issues are rarely ranked as paramount national security priorities. We do so to emphasize their crucial and growing importance.

 

Third, we must ensure coherence and effectiveness in the institutions of the Executive Branch of government. Section III, Institutional Redesign, proposes change throughout the national security apparatus.

 

Fourth, we must ensure the highest caliber human capital in public service. U.S. national security depends on the quality of the people, both civilian and military, serving within the ranks of government. If we are unsuccessful in meeting the crisis of competence before us, none of the other reforms proposed in this report will succeed. Section IV, The Human Requirements for National Security, examines government personnel issues in detail.

 

Fifth, the Congress is part of the problem before us, and therefore must become part of the solution. Not only must the Congress support the Executive Branch reforms promulgated here, but it must bring its own organization in line with the 21st century. Section V, The Role of Congress, examines this critical facet of government reform.

Congress must be in submission to the Executive? Despotic Rule? Called your congressman/woman lately? Gotten a response?

 

Each section of this report carries an introduction explaining why the subject is important, identifies the major problems requiring solution, and then states this Commission's recommendations. All major recommendations are in bold-face type.*6

Related but subordinate recommendations are italicized and in bold-face type in the text.

 

As appropriate throughout the report, we outline what Congressional, Presidential, and Executive department actions would be required to implement the Commission's recommendations.

(Bipartisanship without approval of the people? Bush's move for this bi-partisanship?)

 

Also as appropriate, we provide general guidance as to the budgetary implications of our recommendations but, lest details of such consideration confuse and complicate the text, will provide suggested implementation plans for selected areas in a separately issued addendum. A last word urges the President to devise an implementing mechanism for the recommendations put forth here.

Was the World Trade Center Destruction that devise which has implemented this mechanism?

Finally, we observe that some of our recommendations will save money, while others call for more expenditure. We have not tried to "balance the books" among our recommendations, nor have we held financial implications foremost in mind during our work. Wherever money may be saved, we consider it a second-order benefit. Provision of additional resources to national security, where necessary, are investments, not costs, and a first-order national priority.

Excerpt From "Protocols"

WE NAME PRESIDENTS

11. In the near future we shall establish the responsibility of presidents.

12. By that time we shall be in a position to disregard forms in carrying through matters for which our impersonal puppet will be responsible. What do we care if the ranks of those striving for power should be thinned, if there should arise a deadlock from the impossibility of finding presidents, a deadlock which will finally disorganize the country? ...

 

Please note the presidential campaign 2000. The perfect deadlock. The gridlock of the senate and congress. The cry for democracy of the masses. The cry that every vote to count. The cry to destroy the constitutional electorate college vote.

 

 

I. Securing the National Homeland

 

One of this Commission's most important conclusions in its Phase I report was that attacks against American citizens on American soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter century.(How about within 6 months?)*7 This is because both the technical means for such attacks, and the array of actors who might use such means, are proliferating despite the best efforts of American diplomacy.

Within seconds after the first plane struck the tower, the amazing media was already declaring that the terrorist was Osama bin Laden the 26 year CIA operative and friend of the Bush family.

 

These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass disruption.

favorite new fear word. Wii soon be Media weapons of Mass discussion.

 

 As porous as U.S. physical borders are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, its "cyber borders" are even more porous-and the critical infrastructure upon which so much of the U.S. economy depends can now be targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's present global predominance does not render it immune from these dangers. To the contrary, U.S. preeminence makes the American homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness and freedoms make it more vulnerable.

Aha! If they eliminate freedom they eliminate the enemy? What enemy? an enemy they have created?

 

Notwithstanding a growing consensus on the seriousness of the threat to the homeland posed by weapons of mass destruction and disruption, the U.S. government has not adopted homeland security as a primary national security mission. (Blackmail inserted here) Its structures and strategies are fragmented and inadequate. The President must therefore both develop a comprehensive strategy and propose new organizational structures to prevent and protect against attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection should fail.

and if he doesn't? Will two World Trade Center Towers be destroyed in order to brighten this idea?

 

Any reorganization must be mindful of the scale of the scenarios we envision and the enormity of their consequences. We need orders-of-magnitude improvements in planning, coordination, and exercise. The government must also be prepared to use effectively-albeit with all proper safeguards-the extensive resources of the Department of Defense. This will necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces and particularly, in our view, for the National Guard.

Excerpts From the "Protocols" 

13. In order that our scheme may produce this result we shall arrange elections in favor of such presidents as have in their past some dark, undiscovered stain, some "Panama" or other - then they will be trustworthy agents for the accomplishment of our plans out of fear of revelations and from the natural desire of everyone who has attained power, namely, the retention of the privileges, advantages and honor connected with the office of president. The chamber of deputies will provide cover for, will protect, will elect presidents, but we shall take from it the right to propose new, or make changes in existing laws, for this right will be given by us to the responsible president, a puppet in our hands. Naturally, the authority of the presidents will then become a target for every possible form of attack, but we shall provide him with a means of self-defense in the right of an appeal to the people, for the decision of the people over the heads of their representatives, that is to say, an appeal to that some blind slave of ours - the majority of the mob. Independently of this we shall invest the president with the right of declaring a state of war. We shall justify this last right on the ground that the president as chief of the whole army of the country must have it at his disposal, in case of need for the defense of the new republican constitution, the right to defend which will belong to him as the responsible representative of this constitution.

Is the Panama the Skull & Bones activities? George H. Bush Activities? Prescott financing Adolph Hitler activities with Brown Harriman?

14. It is easy to understand them in these conditions the key of the shrine will lie in our hands, and no one outside ourselves will any longer direct the force of legislation.

15. Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the Chamber the right of interpolation on government measures, on the pretext of preserving political secrecy, and, further, we shall by the new constitution reduce the number of representatives to a minimum, thereby proportionately reducing political passions and the passion for politics. If, however, they should, which is hardly to be expected, burst into flame, even in this minimum, we shall nullify them by a stirring appeal and a reference to the majority of the whole people ... Upon the president will depend the appointment of presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber and the Senate. Instead of constant sessions of Parliaments we shall reduce their sittings to a few months. Moreover, the president, as chief of the executive power, will have the right to summon and dissolve Parliament, and, in the latter case, to prolong the time for the appointment of a new parliamentary assembly. But in order that the consequences of all these acts which in substance are illegal, should not, prematurely for our plans, upon the responsibility established by use of the president, WE SHALL INSTIGATE MINISTERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE HIGHER ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT TO EVADE HIS DISPOSITIONS BY TAKING MEASURES OF THEIR OWN, for doing which they will be made the scapegoats in his place ... This part we especially recommend to be given to be played by the Senate, the Council of State, or the Council of Ministers, but not to an individual official.

16. The president will, at our discretion, interpret the sense of such of the existing laws

 

 

The United States, however, is very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland. The assets and organizations that now exist for homeland security are scattered across more than two dozen departments and agencies, and all fifty states. The Executive Branch, with the full participation of Congress, needs to realign, refine, and rationalize these assets into a coherent whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle for implementation.

 

This Commission believes that the security of the American homeland from the threats of the new century should be the primary national security mission of the U.S. government. (Newly formed war on Terrorism and newly formed terrorist insert here) While the Executive Branch must take the lead in dealing with the many policy and structural issues involved, Congress is a partner of critical importance in this effort. It must find ways to address homeland security issues that bridge current gaps in organization, oversight, and authority, and that resolve conflicting claims to jurisdiction within both the Senate and the House of Representatives and also between them.

 

Congress is crucial, as well, for guaranteeing that homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that protects the civil liberties and privacy of American citizens. We are confident that the U.S. government can enhance national security without compromising established Constitutional principles. But in order to guarantee this, we must plan ahead. In a major attack involving contagious biological agents, for example, 

citizen cooperation with government authorities will depend on public confidence that those authorities can manage the emergency. 

introducing T.I.P.S, people spying on their neighbors.

 

If that confidence is lacking, panic and disorder could lead to insistent demands for the temporary suspension of some civil liberties. 

Anthrax-anthrax-small pox-anthrax-smallpox-nuclear-death-then maybe a little disorder perhaps?

Yes it will indeed happen again, won't it, commission?

4. WHEN WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED OUR COUP D'ETAT WE SHALL SAY THEN TO THE VARIOUS PEOPLES: "EVERYTHING HAS GONE TERRIBLY BADLY, ALL HAVE BEEN WORN OUT WITH SUFFERING. WE ARE DESTROYING THE CAUSES OF YOUR TORMENT - NATIONALITIES, FRONTIERS, DIFFERENCES OF COINAGES. YOU ARE AT LIBERTY, OF COURSE, TO PRONOUNCE SENTENCE UPON US, BUT CAN IT POSSIBLY BE A JUST ONE IF IT IS CONFIRMED BY YOU BEFORE YOU MAKE ANY TRIAL OF WHAT WE ARE OFFERING YOU." ... THEN WILL THE MOB EXALT US AND BEAR US UP IN THEIR HANDS IN A UNANIMOUS TRIUMPH OF HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS. VOTING, WHICH WE HAVE MADE THE INSTRUMENT WHICH WILL SET US ON THE THRONE OF THE WORLD BY TEACHING EVEN THE VERY SMALLEST UNITS OF MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RACE TO VOTE BY MEANS OF MEETINGS AND AGREEMENTS BY GROUPS, WILL THEN HAVE SERVED ITS PURPOSES AND WILL PLAY ITS PART THEN FOR THE LAST TIME BY A UNANIMITY OF DESIRE TO MAKE CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE WITH US BEFORE CONDEMNING US.

 

That is why preparing for the worst is essential to protecting individual freedoms during a national crisis. Legislative guidance for planning among federal agencies and state and local authorities must take particular cognizance of the role of the Defense Department. Its subordination to civil authority needs to be clearly defined in advance. 

Militarize the civil police?

In short, advances in technology have created new dimensions to our nation's economic and physical security. While some new threats can be met with traditional responses, others cannot. More needs to be done in three areas to prevent the territory and infrastructure of the United States from becoming easy and tempting targets: in strategy, in organizational realignment, and in Executive-Legislative cooperation. We take these areas in turn.

 

Excerpt from "Protocols"
16. The president will, at our discretion, interpret the sense of such of the existing laws as admit of various interpretation; he will further annul them when we indicate to him the necessity to do so, besides this, he will have the right to propose temporary laws, and even new departures in the government constitutional working, the pretext both for the one and the other being the requirements for the supreme welfare of the State.

 

 

Executive Orders?

 

A. THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

 

A homeland security strategy to minimize the threat of intimidation and loss of life is an essential support for an international leadership role for the United States. Homeland security is not peripheral to U.S. national security strategy but central to it. At this point, national leaders have not agreed on a clear strategy for homeland security, a condition this Commission finds dangerous and intolerable. We therefore recommend the following:

They will no longer tolerate our freedoms?

 

· 1: The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.

 

In our view, the President should:

 

· Give new priority in his overall national security strategy to homeland security, and make it a central concern for incoming officials in all Executive Branch departments, particularly the intelligence and law enforcement communities;

 

· Calmly prepare the American people for prospective threats, and increase their awareness of what federal and state governments are doing to prevent attacks and to protect them if prevention fails;

Psychological preparation through the media? Big Brother's ministry of truth?

 

· Put in place new government organizations and processes, eliminating where possible staff duplication and mission overlap; and

 

· Encourage Congress to establish new mechanisms to facilitate closer cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of government on this vital issue.

 

We believe that homeland security can best be assured through a strategy of layered defense that focuses first on prevention, second on protection, and third on response.

 

Prevention: Preventing a potential attack comes first. Since the occurrence of even one event that causes catastrophic loss of life would represent an unacceptable failure of policy, U.S. strategy should therefore act as far forward as possible to prevent attacks on the homeland. This strategy has at its disposal three essential instruments.

 

Most broadly, the first instrument is U.S. diplomacy. U.S. foreign policy should strive to shape an international system in which just grievances can be addressed without violence. Diplomatic efforts to develop friendly and trusting relations with foreign governments and their people can significantly multiply America's chances of gaining early warning of potential attack and of doing something about impending threats. Intelligence-sharing with foreign governments is crucial to help identify individuals and groups who might be considering attacks on the United States or its allies. Cooperative foreign law enforcement agencies can detain, arrest, and prosecute terrorists on their own soil. Diplomatic success in resolving overseas conflicts that spawn terrorist activities will help in the long run.

 

Meanwhile, verifiable arms control and nonproliferation must remain a top priority. These policies can help persuade states and terrorists to abjure weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the export of fissile materials and dangerous dual-use technologies. But such measures cannot by themselves prevent proliferation. So other measures are needed, including the possibility of punitive measures and defenses. The United States should take a lead role in strengthening multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

 

In addition, increased vigilance against international crime syndicates is also important because many terrorist organizations gain resources and other assets through criminal activity that they then use to mount terrorist operations. Dealing with international organized crime requires not only better cooperation with other countries, but also among agencies of the federal government. While progress has been made on this front in recent years, more remains to be done.*8 The second instrument of homeland security consists of the U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas. Knowing the who, where, and how of a potential physical or cyber attack is the key to stopping a strike before it can be delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence, and military agencies overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working abroad, are America's primary eyes and ears on the ground. But increased public-private efforts to enhance security processes within the international transportation and logistics networks that bring people and goods to America are also of critical and growing importance.

Excerpts from "Protocols

17. By such measure we shall obtain the power of destroying little by little, step by step, all that at the outset when we enter on our rights, we are compelled to introduce into the constitutions of States to prepare for the transition to an imperceptible abolition of every kind of constitution, and then the time is come to turn every form of government into OUR DESPOTISM.

18. The recognition of our despot may also come before the destruction of the constitution; the moment for this recognition will come when the peoples, utterly wearied by the irregularities and incompetence - a matter which we shall arrange for - of their rulers, will clamor: "Away with them and give us one king over all the earth who will unite us and annihilate the causes of disorders - frontiers, nationalities, religions, State debts - who will give us peace and quiet which we cannot find under our rulers and representatives."

19. But you yourselves perfectly well know that TO PRODUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EXPRESSION OF SUCH WISHES BY ALL THE NATIONS IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO TROUBLE IN ALL COUNTRIES THE PEOPLE'S RELATIONS WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS SO AS TO UTTERLY EXHAUST HUMANITY WITH DISSENSION, HATRED, STRUGGLE, ENVY AND EVEN BY THE USE OF TORTURE, BY STARVATION, BY THE INOCULATION OF DISEASES, BY WANT, SO THAT THE "GOYIM" SEE NO OTHER ISSUE THAN TO TAKE REFUGE IN OUR COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY IN MONEY AND IN ALL ELSE.

20. But if we give the nations of the world a breathing space the moment we long for is hardly likely ever to arrive.

 

 

 

Vigilant systems of border security and surveillance are a third instrument that can prevent those agents of attack who are not detected and stopped overseas from actually entering the United States. Agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard have a critical prevention role to play. Terrorists and criminals are finding that the difficulty of policing the rising daily volume and velocities of people and goods that cross U.S. borders makes it easier for them to smuggle weapons and contraband, and to move their operatives into and out of the United States. Improving the capacity of border control agencies to identify and intercept potential threats without creating barriers to efficient trade and travel requires a sub-strategy also with three elements.

 

First is the development of new transportation security procedures and practices designed to reduce the risk that importers, exporters, freight forwarders, and transportation carriers will serve as unwitting conduits for criminal or terrorist activities. Second is bolstering the intelligence gathering, data management, and information sharing capabilities of border control agencies to improve their ability to target high-risk goods and people for inspection. Third is strengthening the capabilities of border control agencies to arrest terrorists or interdict dangerous shipments before they arrive on U.S. soil.

 

These three measures, which place a premium on public-private partnerships, will pay for themselves in short order. They will allow for the more efficient allocation of limited enforcement resources along U.S. borders. There will be fewer disruptive inspections at ports of entry for legitimate businesses and travelers. They will lead to reduced theft and insurance costs, as well. Most important, the underlying philosophy of this approach is one that balances prudence, on the one hand, with American values of openness and free trade on the other. *9 To shield America from the world out of fear of terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists' work for them. To continue business as usual, however, is irresponsible.

 

The same may be said for our growing cyber problems. Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure depends on greater public awareness and improvements in our tools to detect and diagnose intrusions. (introducing DARPA) This will require better information sharing among all federal, state, and local governments as well as with private sector owners and operators. The federal government has these specific tasks:

 

· To serve as a model for the private sector by improving its own security practices;

 

· To address known government security problems on a system-wide basis

 

· To identify and map network interdependencies so that harmful cascading effects among systems can be prevented;

 

· To sponsor vulnerability assessments within both the federal government and the private sector; and

 

· To design and carry out simulations and exercises that test information system security across the nation's entire infrastructure.

Excerpt from "Protocols"

3. Having established approximately the MODUS AGENDI we will occupy ourselves with details of those combinations by which we have still to complete the revolution in the course of the machinery of State in the direction already indicated. By these combinations I mean the freedom of the Press, the right of association, freedom of conscience, the voting principle, and many another that must disappear for ever from the memory of man, or undergo a radical alteration the day after the promulgation of the new constitution. It is only at the moment that we shall be able at once to announce all our orders, for, afterwards, every noticeable alteration will be dangerous, for the following reasons: if this alteration be brought in with harsh severity and in a sense of severity and limitations, it may lead to a feeling of despair caused by fear of new alterations in the same direction; if, on the other hand, it be brought in a sense of further indulgences it will be said that we have recognized our own wrong-doing and this will destroy the prestige of the infallibility of our authority, or else it will be said that we have become alarmed and are compelled to show a yielding disposition, for which we shall get no thanks because it will be supposed to be compulsory ... Both the one and the other are injurious to the prestige of the new constitution. What we want is that from the first moment of its promulgation, while the peoples of the world are still stunned by the accomplished fact of the revolution, still in a condition of terror and uncertainty, they should recognize once for all that we are so strong, so inexpugnable, so super-abundantly filled with power, that in no case shall we take any account of them, and so far from paying any attention to their opinions or wishes, we are ready and able to crush with irresistible power all expression or manifestation thereof at every moment and in every place, that we have seized at once everything we wanted and shall in no case divide our power with them ... Then in fear and trembling they will close their eyes to everything, and be content to await what will be the end of it all.

7. Our kingdom will be an apologia of the divinity Vishnu, in whom is found its personification - in our hundred hands will be, one in each, the springs of the machinery of social life. We shall see everything without the aid of official police which, in that scope of its rights which we elaborated for the use of the GOYIM, hinders governments from seeing. In our programs ONE-THIRD OF OUR SUBJECTS WILL KEEP THE REST UNDER OBSERVATION from a sense of duty, on the principle of volunteer service to the State. It will then be no disgrace to be a spy and informer, but a merit: unfounded denunciations, however, will be cruelly punished that there may be development of abuses of this right.

8. Our agents will be taken from the higher as well as the lower ranks of society, from among the administrative class who spend their time in amusements, editors, printers and publishers, booksellers, clerks, and salesmen, workmen, coachmen, lackeys, et cetera. This body, having no rights and not being empowered to take any action on their own account, and consequently a police without any power, will only witness and report: verification of their reports and arrests will depend upon a responsible group of controllers of police affairs, while the actual act of arrest will be performed by the gendarmerie and the municipal police. Any person not denouncing anything seen or heard concerning questions of polity will also be charged with and made responsible for concealment, if it be proved that he is guilty of this crime.

 

Preventing attacks on the American homeland also requires that the United States maintain long-range strike capabilities.(While forcing other small sovereign nations to stop strike capabilities) The United States must bolster deterrence by making clear its determination to use military force in a preemptive fashion if necessary.(MUCH LIKE WE DID AT HIROSHIMA) Even the most hostile state sponsors of terrorism, or terrorists themselves, will think twice about harming Americans and American allies and interests if they fear direct and severe U.S. attack after-or before-the fact. Such capabilities should be available for preemption as well as for retaliation, and will therefore strengthen deterrence.

 

Protection: The Defense Department undertakes many different activities that serve to protect the American homeland, and these should be integrated into an overall surveillance system, buttressed with additional resources. A ballistic missile defense system would be a useful addition and should be developed to the extent technically feasible, fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. Defenses should also be pursued against cruise missiles and other sophisticated atmospheric weapon technologies as they become more widely deployed. While both active duty and reserve forces are involved in these activities, the Commission believes that more can and should be done by the National Guard, as is discussed in more detail below. Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure and providing cyber-security must also include:

 

· Advanced indication, warning, and attack assessments;

 

· A warning system that includes voluntary, immediate private-sector reporting of potential attacks to enable other private-sector targets (and the U.S. government) better to take protective action; and

 

· Advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing backups, and restoring service.

 

Response: Managing the consequences of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult process. The first priority should be to build up and augment state and local response capabilities. Adequate equipment must be available to first responders in local communities. Procedures and guidelines need to be defined and disseminated and then practiced through simulations and exercises. Interoperable, robust, and redundant communications capabilities are a must in recovering from any disaster. Continuity of government and critical services must be ensured as well. Demonstrating effective responses to natural and manmade disasters will also help to build mutual confidence and relationships among those with roles in dealing with a major terrorist attack.

 

All of this puts a premium on making sure that the disparate organizations involved with homeland security-on various levels of government and in the private sector-can work together effectively. We are frankly skeptical that the U.S. government, as it exists today, can respond effectively to the scale of danger and damage that may come upon us during the next quarter century. This leads us, then, to our second task: that of organizational realignment.

Excerpts From "Protocols"

1. When it becomes necessary for us to strengthen the strict measures of secret defense (the most fatal poison for the prestige of authority) we shall arrange a simulation of disorders or some manifestation of discontents finding expression through the co- operation of good speakers. Round these speakers will assemble all who are sympathetic to his utterances. This will give us the pretext for domiciliary prerequisitions and surveillance on the part of our servants from among the number of the GOYIM police ....

 

B. ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT

 

Responsibility for homeland security resides at all levels of the U.S. government- local, state, and federal. Within the federal government, almost every agency and department is involved in some aspect of homeland security. None have been organized to focus on the scale of the contemporary threat to the homeland, however. This Commission urges an organizational realignment that:

 

· Designates a single person, accountable to the President, to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government activities related to homeland security;

Governor Tom Ridge designated as head of "Homeland Security Chief" in wake of Terror

 

· Consolidates certain homeland security activities to improve their effectiveness and coherence;

 

· Establishes planning mechanisms so as clearly to define specific responses to specific types of threats; and

 

· Ensures that the appropriate resources and capabilities are available. Therefore, this Commission strongly recommends the following:

 

· 2: The President should propose, and Congress should agree, to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. They should use the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a key building block in this effort.

 

Given the multiplicity of agencies and activities involved in these homeland security tasks, someone needs to be responsible and accountable to the President not only to coordinate the making of policy, but also to oversee its implementation. This argues against assigning the role to a senior person on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and for the creation of a separate agency. This agency would give priority to overall planning while relying primarily on others to carry out those plans. To give this agency sufficient stature within the government, its director would be a member of the Cabinet and a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. The position would require Senate confirmation.

 

Notwithstanding NHSA's responsibilities, the National Security Council would still play a strategic role in planning and coordinating all homeland security activities. This would include those of NHSA as well as those that remain separate, whether they involve other NSC members or other agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of Health and Human Services.

 

We propose building the National Homeland Security Agency upon the capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an existing federal agency that has performed well in recent years, especially in responding to natural disasters. NHSA would be legislatively chartered to provide a focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency planning scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA's ten existing regional offices as a core element of its organizational structure.

 

 

While FEMA is the necessary core of the National Homeland Security Agency, it is not sufficient to do what NHSA needs to do. In particular, patrolling U.S. borders, and policing the flows of peoples and goods through the hundreds of ports of entry, must receive higher priority. These activities need to be better integrated, but efforts toward that end are hindered by the fact that the three organizations on the front line of border security are spread across three different U.S. Cabinet departments. The Coast Guard works under the Secretary of Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the Department of the Treasury, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service oversees the Border Patrol in the Department of Justice. In each case, the border defense agency is far from the mainstream of its parent department's agenda and consequently receives limited attention from the department's senior officials. We therefore recommend the following:

 

3: The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities.

 

 

Bringing these organizations together under one agency will create important synergies. Their individual capabilities will be molded into a stronger and more effective system, and this realignment will help ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to tasks crucial to both public safety and U.S. trade and economic interests. Consolidating overhead, training programs, and maintenance of the aircraft, boats, and helicopters that these three agencies employ will save money, and further efficiencies could be realized with regard to other resources such as information technology, communications equipment, and dedicated sensors. Bringing these separate, but complementary, activities together will also facilitate more effective Executive and Legislative oversight, and help rationalize the process of budget preparation, analysis, and presentation.

 

Steps must be also taken to strengthen these three individual organizations themselves. The Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard are all on the verge of being overwhelmed by the mismatch between their growing duties and their mostly static resources.

 

The Customs Service, for example, is charged with preventing contraband from entering the United States. It is also responsible for preventing terrorists from using the commercial or private transportation venues of international trade for smuggling explosives or weapons of mass destruction into or out of the United States. The Customs Service, however, retains only a modest air, land, and marine interdiction force, and its investigative component, supported by its own intelligence branch, is similarly modest. The high volume of conveyances, cargo, and passengers arriving in the United States each year already overwhelms the Customs Service's capabilities. Over $8.8 billion worth of goods, over 1.3 million people, over 340,000 vehicles, and over 58,000 shipments are processed daily at entry points. Of this volume, Customs can inspect only one to two percent of all inbound shipments. The volume of U.S. international trade, measured in terms of dollars and containers, has doubled since 1995, and it may well double again between now and 2005.

 

Therefore, this Commission believes that an improved computer information capability and tracking system-as well as upgraded equipment that can detect both conventional and nuclear explosives, and chemical and biological agents-would be a wise short-term investment with important long-term benefits. It would also raise the risk for criminals seeking to target or exploit importers and cargo carriers for illicit gains.*10

 

The Border Patrol is the uniformed arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Its mission is the detection and prevention of illegal entry into the United States. It works primarily between ports of entry and patrols the borders by various means. There has been a debate for many years about whether the dual functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service-border control and enforcement on the one side, and immigration facilitation on the other-should be joined under the same roof. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that they should not be joined.*11

 

We agree: the Border Patrol should become part of the NHSA. The U.S. Coast Guard is a highly disciplined force with multiple missions and a natural role to play in homeland security. It performs maritime search and rescue missions, manages vessel traffic, enforces U.S. environmental and fishery laws, and interdicts and searches vessels suspected of carrying illegal aliens, drugs, and other contraband. In a time of war, it also works with the Navy to protect U.S. ports from attack.

 

Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model homeland security agency given its unique blend of law enforcement, regulatory, and military authorities that allow it to operate within, across, and beyond U.S. borders. It accomplishes its many missions by routinely working with numerous local, regional, national, and international agencies, and by forging and maintaining constructive relationships with a diverse group of private, non-governmental, and public marine-related organizations. As the fifth armed service, in peace and war, it has national defense missions that include port security, overseeing the defense of coastal waters, and supporting and integrating its forces with those of the Navy and the other services.

No Jurisdiction requirements, uninhibited?

 

The case for preserving and enhancing the Coast Guard's multi-mission capabilities is compelling. But its crucial role in protecting national interests close to home has not been adequately appreciated, and this has resulted in serious and growing readiness concerns. U.S. Coast Guard ships and aircraft are aging and technologically obsolete; indeed, the Coast Guard cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval fleets. As a result, the Coast Guard fleet generates excessive operating and maintenance costs, and lacks essential capabilities in speed, sensors, and interoperability. To fulfill all of its missions, the Coast Guard requires updated platforms with the staying power, in hazardous weather, to remain offshore and fully operational throughout U.S. maritime economic zones.*12

 

The Commission recommends strongly that Congress recapitalize the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard so that they can confidently perform key homeland security roles.

 

HSA's planning, coordinating, and overseeing activities would be undertaken through three staff Directorates. The Directorate of Prevention would oversee and coordinate the various border security activities. A Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) would be created to handle the growing cyber threat. FEMA's emergency preparedness and response activities would be strengthened in a third directorate to cover both natural and manmade disasters. A Science and Technology office would advise the NHSA Director on research and development efforts and priorities for all three directorates. Relatively small permanent staffs would man the directorates. NHSA will employ FEMA's principle of working effectively with state and local governments, as well as with other federal organizations, stressing interagency coordination. Much of NHSA's daily work will take place directly supporting state officials in its regional offices around the country. Its organizational infrastructure will not be heavily centered in the Washington, DC area. NHSA would also house a National Crisis Action Center (NCAC), which would become the nation's focal point for monitoring emergencies and for coordinating federal support in a crisis to state and local governments, as well as to the private sector. We envision the center to be an interagency operation, directed by a two-star National Guard general, with full-time representation from the other federal agencies involved in homeland security (See Figure 1).

 

 

Excerpt From "Protocols"

 

Our Directorate must surround itself with all these forces of civilization among which it will have to work. It will surround itself with publicists, practical jurists, administrators, diplomats and, finally, with persons prepared by a special super-educational training IN OUR SPECIAL SCHOOLS (Rhode Scholers?). These persons will have consonance of all the secrets of the social structure, they will know all the languages that can be made up by political alphabets and words; they will be made acquainted with the whole underside of human nature, with all its sensitive chords on which they will have to play.

Figure 1: National Homeland Security Agency NHSA will require a particularly close working relationship with the Department of Defense. It will need also to create and maintain strong mechanisms for the sharing of information and intelligence with U.S. domestic and international intelligence entities. We suggest that NHSA have liaison officers in the counter-terrorism centers of both the FBI and the CIA. Additionally, the sharing of information with business and industry on threats to critical infrastructures will require further expansion.

NHSA will also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure. Considerable progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63). But more needs to be done, for the United States has real and growing problems in this area.

 

PDD-63

4 September 2000. Thanks to RT.

Each page imprinted with three large "4"s. See image of first page: http://cryptome.org/pdd63-1.jpg (126KB)

[18 pages.]

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                         THE WHITE HOUSE
    
                             WASHINGTON
                                                     [Stamp]
                                                98 MAY 22 PM 2:14
                            May 22, 1998
                                                        OSD
                                                 WHITE HOUSE LIAISON

    PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-63
    
    MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
                   THE SECRETARY OF STATE
                   THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
                   THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                   THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
                   THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
                   THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
                   THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
                   THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
                   THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
                   ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY    
                   THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
                   THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
                   THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
                   THE ASSIST TO THE PRESIDENT FOR    
                     NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS     
                   THE ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR
                     SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY    
                   THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
                   THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                   THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
    
    SUBJECT:    Critical Infrastructure Protection

    
    1.  A Growing Potential Vulnerability
    
    The United States possesses both the world's strongest military
    and its largest national economy.  Those two aspects of our
    power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. They are also
    increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and
    upon cyber-based information systems.
    
    Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based
    systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and
    government. They include, but are not limited to,
    telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation,


    
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    water systems and emergency services, both governmental and
    private.  Many of the nation's critical infrastructures have
    historically been physically and logically separate systems that
    had little interdependence.  As a result of advances in
    information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency,
    however, these infrastructures have become increasingly
    automated and interlinked.  These same advances have created new
    vulnerabilities to equipment failure, human error, weather and
    other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks.
    Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require
    flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and
    private sectors, and protect both domestic and international
    security.
    
    Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether
    nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-
    traditional ways including attacks within the United States.
    Because our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent
    and cyber-supported infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on
    our infrastructure and information systems may be capable of
    significantly harming both our military power and our economy.

    II.  President's Intent

    It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the
    continuity and viability of critical infrastructures.  I intend
    that the United States will take all necessary measures to
    swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical
    and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including
    especially our cyber systems.
    
    III.  A National Goal
    
    No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have
    achieved an initial operating capability and no later than five
    years from today the United States shall have achieved and shall
    maintain the ability to protect the nation's critical
    infrastructures from intentional acts that would significantly
    diminish the abilities of:
    
    * the Federal Government to perform essential national security
      missions and to ensure the general public health and safety;
    
    * state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver
      minimum essential public services.

    

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    * the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the
      economy and the delivery of essential telecommunications,
      energy, financial and transportation services.

    Any interruptions or manipulations of these critical functions
    must be brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated
    and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States.
    
    IV.  A Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability
    
    Since the targets of attacks on our critical infrastructure
    would likely include both facilities in the economy and those in
    the government, the elimination of our potential vulnerability
    requires a closely coordinated effort of both the government and
    the private sector. To succeed, this partnership must be
    genuine, mutual and cooperative.  In seeking to meet our
    national goal to eliminate the vulnerabilities of our critical
    infrastructure, therefore, we should, to the extent feasible,
    seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation or
    expand unfunded government mandates to the private sector.
    
    For each of the major sectors of our economy that are vulnerable
    to infrastructure attack, the Federal Government will appoint
    from a designated Lead Agency a senior officer of that agency as
    the Sector Liaison Official to work with the private sector.
    Sector Liaison Officials, after discussions and coordination
    with private sector entities of their infrastructure sector,
    will identify a private sector or counterpart (Sector Coordinator)
    to represent their sector.
    
    Together these two individuals and the departments and
    corporations they represent shall contribute to a sectoral
    National Infrastructure Assurance Plan by:
    
    * assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or
      physical attacks;
    
    * recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities;
    
    * proposing a system for identifying and preventing attempted
      major attacks;
    
    * developing a plan for alerting, containing and rebuffing an
      attack in progress and then, in coordination with FEMA as
      appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum essential
      capabilities in the aftermath of an attack.



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    During the preparation of the sectoral plans, the National
    Coordinator (see section VI), in conjunction with the Lead
    Agency Sector Liaison Officials and a representative from the
    National Economic Council, shall ensure their overall
    coordination and the integration of the various sectoral plans,
    with a particular focus on interdependencies.
    
    V.  Guidelines
    
    In addressing this potential vulnerability and the means of
    eliminating it, I want those involved to be mindful of the
    following general principles and concerns.
    
    * We shall consult with, and seek input from, the Congress on
      approaches and programs to meet the objectives set forth in
      this directive.
    
    * The protection of our critical infrastructures is necessarily
      a shared responsibility and partnership between owners,
      operators and the government.  Furthermore, the Federal
      Government shall encourage international cooperation to help
      manage this increasingly global problem.

    * Frequent assessments shall be made of our critical
      infrastructures' existing reliability, vulnerability and
      threat environment because, as technology and the nature of
      the threats to our critical infrastructures will continue to
      change rapidly, so must our protective measures and responses
      be robustly adaptive.
    
    * The incentives that the market provides are the first choice
      for addressing the problem of critical infrastructure
      protection; regulation will be used only in the face of a
      material failure of the market to protect the health, safety
      or well-being of the American people.  In such cases, agencies
      shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct
      regulation, including providing economic incentives to
      encourage the desired behavior, providing information upon
      which choices can be made by the private sector.  These
      incentives, along with other action, shall be designed to
      help harness the latest technologies, bring about global
      solutions to international problems, and enable private sector
      owners and operators to achieve and maintain the maximum
      feasible security.



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    * The full authorities, capabilities and resources of the
      government, including law enforcement, regulation, foreign
      intelligence and defense preparedness shall be available, as
      appropriate, to ensure that critical infrastructure protection
      is achieved and maintained.

    * Care must be taken to respect privacy rights.  Consumers and
      operators must have confidence that information will be
      handled accurately, confidentially and reliably.
    
    * The Federal Government shall, through its research,
      development and procurement, encourage the introduction of
      increasingly capable methods of infrastructure protection.
    
    * The Federal Government shall serve as a model to the private
      sector on how infrastructure assurance is best achieved and
      shall, to the extent feasible, distribute the results of its
      endeavors.
    
    * We must focus on preventive measure as well as threat and
      crisis management. To that end, private sector owners and
      operators should be encouraged to provide maximum feasible
      security for the infrastructures they control and to provide
      the government necessary information to assist them in that
      task. In order to engage the private sector fully, it is
      preferred that participation by owners and operators in a
      national infrastructure protection system be voluntary.
    
    * Close cooperation and coordination with state and local 
      governments and first responders is essential for a robust and
      flexible infrastructure protection program. All critical 
      infrastructure protection plans and action shall take into 
      consideration the needs, activities and responsibilities of 
      state and local governments and first responders.
    
    VI.  Structure and Organization
    
    The Federal Government will be organized for the purposes of
    this endeavor around four components (elaborated in Annex A).
    
    1.  Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison: For each infrastructure
        sector that could be a target for significant cyber or
        physical attack, there will be a single U.S. Government
        department which will serve as the lead agency for liaison.
        Each Lead Agency will designate the individual of Assistant



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        Secretary rank or higher to be the Sector Liaison Official
        for that area and to cooperate with the private sector
        representatives (Sector Coordinators) in addressing problems
        related to critical infrastructure protection and, in
        particular, in recommending components of the National
        Infrastructure Protection Plan.  Together, the Lead Agency
        and the private sector counterparts will develop and
        implement a Vulnerability Awareness and Education Program
        for their sector.

    2.  Lead Agencies for Special Functions: There are, in
        addition, certain functions related to critical
        infrastructure protection that must be chiefly performed by
        the Federal Government (national defense, foreign affairs,
        intelligence, law enforcement). For each of those special
        functions, there shall be a Lead Agency which will be
        responsible for coordinating all of the activities of the
        United States Government in that area. Each lead agency
        will appoint a senior officer of Assistant Secretary rank or
        higher to serve as the Functional Coordinator for that
        function for the Federal Government.

    3.  Interagency Coordination:  The Sector Liaison Officials and
        Functional Coordinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as
        representatives from other relevant departments and
        agencies, including the National Economic Council, will meet
        to coordinate the implementation of this directive under the
        auspices of a Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group
        (CICG), chaired by the National Coordinator for Security,
        Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The
        National Coordinator will be appointed by me and report to
        me through the Assistant to the President for National
        Security Affairs, who shall assure appropriate coordination
        with the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs.
        Agency representatives to the CICG should be at a senior
        policy level (Assistant Secretary or higher). Where
        appropriate, the CICG will be assisted by extant policy
        structures, such as the Security Policy Board, Security
        Policy Forum and the National Security and
        Telecommunications and Information System Security
        Committee.   

    4.  National Infrastructure Assurance Council:  On the
        recommendation of the Lead Agencies, the National Economic
        Council and the National Coordinator, I will appoint a panel
        of major infrastructure providers and state and local
        government officials to serve as my National Infrastructure



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        Assurance Council.  I will appoint the Chairman.  The
        National Coordinator will serve as the Council's Executive
        Director.  The National Infrastructure Assurance Council
        will meet periodically to enhance the partnership of the
        public and private sectors in protecting our critical
        infrastructures and will provide reports to me as
        appropriate.  Senior Federal Government officials will
        participate in the meetings of the National Infrastructure
        Assurance Council as appropriate.

    VII.  Protecting Federal Government Critical Infrastructures
    
    Every department and agency of the Federal Government shall be
    responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure,
    especially its cyber-based systems.  Every department and agency
    Chief Information Officer (CIO) shall be responsible for
    information assurance. Every department and agency shall
    appoint a Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO) who
    shall be responsible for the protection of all of the other
    aspects of that department's critical infrastructure. The CIO
    may be double-hatted as the CIAO at the discretion of the
    individual department. These officials shall establish
    procedures for obtaining expedient and valid authorities to
    allow vulnerability assessments to be performed on government
    computer and physical systems.  The Department of Justice shall
    establish legal guidelines for providing for such authorities.

    No later than 180 days from the issuance of this directive, every
    department and agency shall develop a plan for protecting its
    own critical infrastructure, including but not limited to its
    cyber-based systems. The National Coordinator shall be
    responsible for coordinating analyses required by the
    departments and agencies of inter-governmental dependencies and
    the mitigation of those dependencies. The Critical
    infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG) shall sponsor an expert
    review process for those plans. No later than two years from
    today, those plans shall have been implemented and shall be
    updated every two years.  In meeting this schedule, the Federal
    Government shall present a model to the private sector on how
    best to protect critical infrastructure.









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    VIII.  Tasks

    Within 180 days, the Principals Committee should submit to me a
    schedule for completion of a National Infrastructure Assurance
    Plan with milestones for accomplishing the following subordinate
    and related tasks.
    
    1.  Vulnerability Analyses:  For each sector of the economy and
        each sector of the government that might be a target of
        infrastructure attack intended to significantly damage the
        United States, there shall be an initial vulnerability
        assessment, followed by periodic updates. As appropriate,
        these assessments shall also include the determination of the
        minimum essential infrastructure in each sector.
    
    2.  Remedial Plan:  Based upon the vulnerability assessment,
        there shall be a recommended remedial plan. The plan shall
        identify timelines, for implementation, responsibilities and
        funding.
    
    3.  Warning:  A national center to warn of significant
        infrastructure attacks will be established immediately (see
        Annex A).  As soon thereafter as possible, we will put in
        place an enhanced system for detecting and analyzing such
        attacks, with maximum possible participation of the private
        sector.
    
    4.  Response:  We shall develop a system for responding to a
        significant infrastructure attack while it is underway, with
        the goal of isolating and minimizing damage.
    
    5.  Reconstitution:  For varying levels of successful
        infrastructure attacks, we shall have a system to
        reconstitute minimum required capabilities rapidly.
    
    6.  Education and Awareness:  There shall be Vulnerability
        Awareness and Education Program within both the government
        and the private sector to sensitize people regarding the
        importance of security and to train them in security
        standards, particularly regarding cyber systems.

    7.  Research and Development:  Federally-sponsored research and
        development in support of infrastructure protection shall be
        coordinated, be subject to multi-year planning, take into
        account private sector research, and be adequately funded to
        minimize our vulnerabilities on a rapid but achievable
        timetable.



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    8.  Intelligence:  The Intelligence Community shall develop and
        implement a plan for enhancing collection and analysis of the
        foreign threat to our national infrastructure, to include but
        not be limited to the foreign cyber/information warfare
        threat.
    
    9.  International Cooperation:  There shall be a plan to expand
        cooperation on critical infrastructure protection with like-
        minded and friendly nations, international organizations and
        multinational corporations.
    
    10. Legislative and Budgetary Requirements:  There shall be an
        evaluation of the executive branch's legislative authorities
        and budgetary priorities regarding critical infrastructure,
        and ameliorative recommendations shall be made to me as
        necessary. The evaluations and recommendations, if any,
        shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB.
    
    The CICG shall also review and schedule the taskings listed in
    Annex B.

    IX. Implementation

    In addition to the 180-day report, the National Coordinator,
    working with the National Economic Council,  shall provide an
    annual report on the implementation of this directive to me and
    the heads of departments and agencies, through the Assistant to
    the President for National Security Affairs.  The report should
    include an updated threat assessment, a status report on
    achieving the milestones identified for the National Plan and
    additional policy, legislative and budgetary recommendations.
    The evaluations and recommendations, if any, shall be
    coordinated with the Director of OMB.  In addition, following
    the establishment of an initial operating capability in the year
    2000, the National Coordinator shall conduct a zero-based
    review.











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                   Annex A:  Structure and Organization
    
    Lead Agencies:  Clear accountability within the U.S. Government
    must be designated for specific sectors and functions. The
    following assignments of responsibility will apply.

    Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison:
    
       Commerce        Information and communications

       Treasury        Banking and finance
    
       EPA             Water supply
    
       Transportation  Aviation
                       Highways (including trucking and intelligent
                        transportation systems)
                       Mass transit
                       Pipelines
                       Rail
                       Waterborne commerce
    
       Justice/FBI     Emergency law enforcement services

       FEMA            Emergency fire service
                       Continuity of government services

       HHS             Public health services, including prevention,
                       surveillance, laboratory services and
                       personal health services

       Energy          Electric power
                       Oil and gas production and storage
    
    Lead Agencies for Special Functions:
    
       Justice/FBI     Law enforcement and internal security

       CIA             Foreign intelligence

       State           Foreign affairs

       Defense         National defense

    In addition, OSTP shall be responsible for coordinating research
    and development agendas and programs for the government through
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    Commerce is the lead agency for information and communication,
    the Department of Defense will retain its Executive Agent
    responsibilities for the National Communications System and
    support of the President's National Security Telecommunications
    Advisory Committee.

    National Coordinator:  The National Coordinator for Security,
    Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism shall be
    responsible for coordinating the implementation of this
    directive. The National Coordinator will report to me through
    the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
    The National Coordinator will also participate as a full member
    of Deputies or Principals Committee meetings when they meet to
    consider infrastructure issues.  Although the National
    Coordinator will not direct Departments and Agencies, he or she
    will ensure interagency coordination for policy development and
    implementation, and will review crisis activities concerning
    infrastructure events with significant foreign involvement. The
    National Coordinator will provide advice, in the context of the
    established annual budget process, regarding agency budgets for
    critical infrastructure protection.  The National Coordinator
    will chair the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group
    (CICG), reporting to the Deputies Committee (or, at the call of
    its chair, the Principals Committee).  The Sector Liaison
    officials and Special Function Coordinators shall attend the
    CIGC's meetings.  Departments and agencies shall each appoint to
    the CIGC a senior official (Assistant Secretary level or higher)
    who will regularly attend its meetings.  The National Security
    Advisor shall appoint a Senior Director for Infrastructure
    Protection on the NSC staff.
    
    A National Plan Coordination (NPC) staff will be contributed on
    a non-reimbursable basis by the departments and agencies,
    consistent with law. The NPC staff will integrate the various
    sector plans into a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan and
    coordinate analyses of the U.S. Government's own dependencies on
    critical infrastructures. The NPC staff will also help
    coordinate a national education and awareness program, and
    legislative and public affairs.
    
    The Defense Department shall continue to serve as Executive
    Agent for the Commission Transition Office, which will form the
    basis of the NPC, during the remainder of FY98. Beginning in
    FY99, the NPC shall be an office of the Commerce Department. The
    office of Personnel Management shall provide the necessary
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    terminate at the end of FY01, unless extended by Presidential
    directive.

    Warning and Information Centers

    As part of a national warning and information sharing system, I
    immediately authorize the FBI to expand its current organization
    to a full scale National Infrastructure Protection Center
    (NIPC).  This organization shall serve as a national critical
    infrastructure threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and
    law enforcement investigation and response entity.  During the
    initial period of six to twelve months, I also direct the
    National Coordinator and the Sector Liaison Officials, working
    together with the Sector Coordinators, the Special Function
    Coordinators and representatives from the National Economic
    Council, as appropriate, to consult with owners and operators of
    the critical infrastructures to encourage the creation of a
    private sector sharing and analysis center, as described below.

    National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC): The NIPC will
    include FBI, USSS, and other investigators experienced in
    computer crimes and infrastructure protection, as well as
    representatives detailed from the Department of Defense, the
    Intelligence Community and Lead Agencies. It will be linked
    electronically to the rest of the Federal Government, including
    other warning and operations centers, as well as any private
    sector sharing and analysis centers.  Its mission will include
    providing timely warnings of international threats, comprehensive
    analyses and law enforcement investigation and response.
    
    All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the 
    NIPC and provide such assistance, information and advice that 
    the NIPC may request, to the extent permitted by law.  All 
    executive departments shall also share with the NIPC information 
    about threats and warning of attacks and about actual attacks on 
    critical government and private sector infrastructures, to the 
    extent permitted by law. The NIP will include elements 
    responsible for warning, analysis, computer investigation,
    coordinating emergency response, training, outreach and
    development and application of technical tools. In addition, it
    will establish its own relations directly with others in the
    private sector and with any information sharing and analysis
    entity that the private sector may  create, such as the
    Information Sharing and Analysis Center described below.
    
    The NIPC, in conjunction with the information originating
    agency, will sanitize law enforcement and intelligence



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    information for inclusion into analyses and reports that it will
    provide, in appropriate form, to relevant federal, state and
    local agencies; the relevant owners and operators of critical
    infrastructures; and to any private sector information sharing
    and analysis entity.  Before disseminating national security or
    other information that originated from the intelligence
    community, the NIPC will coordinate fully with the intelligence
    community through existing procedures.  Whether as sanitized or
    unsanitized reports, the NIPC will issue attack warnings or
    alerts to increases in threat condition to any private sector
    information sharing and analysis entity and to the owners and
    operators.  These warnings may also include guidance regarding
    additional protection measures to be taken by owners and
    operators.  Except in extreme emergencies, the NIPC shall
    coordinate with the National Coordinator before issuing public
    warnings of imminent attacks by international terrorists,
    foreign states or other malevolent foreign powers.
    
    The NIPC will provide a national focal point for gathering
    information on threats to the infrastructures.  Additionally,
    the NIPC will provide the principal means of facilitating and
    coordinating the Federal Government's response to an incident,
    mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring
    reconstitution efforts.  Depending on the nature and level of a
    foreign threat/attack, protocols established between special
    function agencies (DOJ/DOD/CIA), and the ultimate decision of
    the President, the NIPC may be placed in a direct support role
    to either DOD or the Intelligence Community.

    Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): The National
    Coordinator, working with Sector Coordinators, Sector Liaison
    Officials and the National Economic Council, shall consult with
    owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to strongly
    encourage the creation of a private sector information sharing
    and analysis center. The actual design and functions of the
    center and its relation to the NIPC will be determined by the
    private sector, in consultation with and with assistance from
    the Federal Government,. Within 180 days of this directive, the
    National Coordinator, with the assistance of the CICG including
    the National Economic Council, shall identify possible methods
    of providing federal assistance to  facilitate the startup of an
    ISAC.
    
    Such a center could serve as the mechanism for gathering,
    analyzing, appropriately sanitizing and disseminating private
    sector information to both industry and the NIPC.  The center
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    NIPC for further distribution to the private sector. While
    crucial to a successful government-industry partnership, this
    mechanism for sharing important information about
    vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies is not to
    interfere with direct information exchanges between companies
    and the government.
    
    As ultimately designed by private sector representatives, the
    ISAC may emulate particular aspects of such institutions as the
    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that have proved
    highly effective, particularly it extensive interchanges with
    the private and non-federal sectors.   Under such a model, the
    ISAC would possess a large degree of technical focus and
    expertise and non-regulatory and non-law enforcement missions.
    it would establish baseline statistics and patterns on the
    various infrastructures, become a clearinghouse for information
    within and among the various sectors, and provide a library for
    historical data to be used be the private sector and, as deemed
    appropriate by the ISAC, by the government.  Critical to the
    success of such an institution would be its timeliness,
    accessibility, coordination, flexibility, utility and
    acceptability.



















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                     Annex B:  Additional Taskings

    Studies

    The National Coordinator shall commission studies on the
    following subjects:

    * Liability issues arising from participation by private sector
      companies in the information sharing process.
    
    * Existing legal impediments to information sharing, with an eye
      to proposals to remove these impediments, including through
      the drafting of model codes in cooperation with the American
      Legal Institute.
    
    * The necessity of document and information classification and
      the impact of such classification on useful dissemination, as
      well as the methods and information systems by which threat
      and vulnerability information can be shared securely while
      avoiding disclosure or unacceptable risk of disclosure to
      those who will misuse it.
    
    * The improved protection, including secure dissemination and
      information handling systems, of industry trade secrets and
      other confidential business data, law enforcement information
      and evidentiary material, classified national security
      information, unclassified material disclosing vulnerabilities
      of privately owned infrastructures and apparently innocuous
      information that, in the aggregate, it is unwise to disclose.
    
    * The implications of sharing information with foreign entities
      where such sharing is deemed necessary to the security of
      United States infrastructures.
    
    * The potential benefit to security standards of mandating,
      subsidizing, or otherwise assisting in the provision of
      insurance for selected critical infrastructure providers and
      requiring insurance tie-ins for foreign critical
      infrastructure providers hoping to do business with the United
      States.






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    Public Outreach
    
    In order to foster a climate of enhanced public sensitivity to
    the problem of infrastructure protection, the following actions
    shall be taken:

    * The White House, under the oversight of the National
      Coordinator, together with the relevant Cabinet agencies shall
      consider a series of conferences:  (1) that will bring
      together national leaders in the public and private sectors to
      propose programs to increase the commitment to information
      security; (2) that convoke academic leaders from engineering,
      computer science, business and law schools to review the
      status of education in information security and will identify
      changes in the curricula and resources necessary to meet the
      national demand for professionals in this field; (3) on the
      issues around computer ethics as these relate to the K through
      12 and general university populations.

    * The National Academy of Science and the National Academy of
      Engineering shall consider a round table bringing together
      federal, state and local officials with industry and academic
      leaders to develop national strategies for enhancing
      infrastructure security.

    * The intelligence community and law enforcement shall expand
      existing programs for briefing infrastructure owners and
      operators and senior government officials.

    * The National Coordinator shall (1) establish a program for
      infrastructure assurance simulations involving senior public
      and private officials, the reports of which might be
      distributed as part of an awareness campaign; and (2) in
      coordination with the private sector, launch a continuing
      national awareness campaign, emphasizing improving
      infrastructure security.
    
    Internal Federal Government Actions
    
    In order for the Federal Government to improve its
    infrastructure security these immediate steps shall be taken:
    
    * The Department of Commerce, the General Services
      Administration, and the Department of Defense shall assist



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      federal agencies in the implementation of best practices for
      information assurance within their individual agencies.
    
    * The National Coordinator shall coordinate a review of existing
      federal, state and local bodies charged with information
      assurance tasks, and provide recommendations on how these
      institutions can cooperate most effectively.
    
    * All federal agencies shall make clear designations regarding
      who may authorize access to their computer systems.
    
    * The Intelligence Community shall elevate and formalize the
      priority for enhanced collection and analysis of information
      on the foreign cyber/information warfare threat to our
      critical infrastructure.
    
    * The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and
      other appropriate agencies shall:  (1) vigorously recruit
      undergraduate and graduate students with the relevant
      computer-related technical skills full-time employment as
      well as for part-time work with regional computer crime
      squads; and (2) facilitate the hiring and retention of
      qualified personnel for technical analysis and investigation
      involving cyber attacks.
    
    * The Department of Transportation, in consultation with the
      Department of Defense, shall undertake a thorough evaluation
      of the vulnerability of the national transportation
      infrastructure that relies on the Global Positioning System.
      This evaluation shall include sponsoring an independent,
      integrated assessment of risks to civilian users of GPS-based
      systems, with a view to basing decisions on the ultimate
      architecture of the modernized NAS on these evaluations.
    
    * The Federal Aviation Administration shall develop and
      implement a comprehensive National Airspace System Security
      Program to protect the modernized NAS from information-based
      and other disruptions and attacks.
    
    * GSA shall identify large procurements (such as the new Federal
      Telecommunications System ETS 2000) related to infrastructure
      assurance, study whether the procurement process reflects the
      importance of infrastructure protection and propose, if
      necessary, revisions to the overall procurement process to do
      so.



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    * OMB shall direct federal agencies to include assigned
      infrastructure assurance functions within their Government
      Performance and Review Act strategic planning and performance
      measurement framework.
    
    * The NSA, in accordance with its National Manager
      responsibilities in NSD 42, shall provide assessments
      encompassing examinations of U.S. Government systems to
      interception and exploitation; disseminate threat and
      vulnerability information; establish standards; conduct
      research and development; and conduct issue security product
      evaluations.
    
    Assisting the Private Sector
    
    in order to assist the private sector in achieving and
    maintaining infrastructure security:
    
    * The National Coordinator and the National Infrastructure
      Assurance Council shall propose and develop ways to encourage
      private industry to perform periodic risk assessments of
      critical processes, including information and
      telecommunications systems.
    
    * The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense shall
      work together, in coordination with the private sector, to
      offer their expertise to private owners and operators of
      critical infrastructure to develop security-related best
      practice standards.
    
    * The Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury shall
      sponsor a comprehensive study compiling demographics of
      computer crime, comparing state approaches to computer crime
      and developing ways to deterring and responding to computer
      crime by juveniles.



                               [Signed:] Bill Clinton   

Excerpt From "Protocols

WE NAME PRESIDENTS

11. In the near future we shall establish the responsibility of presidents.

12. By that time we shall be in a position to disregard forms in carrying through matters for which our impersonal puppet will be responsible. What do we care if the ranks of those striving for power should be thinned, if there should arise a deadlock from the impossibility of finding presidents, a deadlock which will finally disorganize the country? ...

13. In order that our scheme may produce this result we shall arrange elections in favor of such presidents as have in their past some dark, undiscovered stain, some "Panama" or other - then they will be trustworthy agents for the accomplishment of our plans out of fear of revelations and from the natural desire of everyone who has attained power, namely, the retention of the privileges, advantages and honor connected with the office of president. The chamber of deputies will provide cover for, will protect, will elect presidents, but we shall take from it the right to propose new, or make changes in existing laws, for this right will be given by us to the responsible president, a puppet in our hands. Naturally, the authority of the presidents will then become a target for every possible form of attack, but we shall provide him with a means of self-defense in the right of an appeal to the people, for the decision of the people over the heads of their representatives, that is to say, an appeal to that some blind slave of ours - the majority of the mob. Independently of this we shall invest the president with the right of declaring a state of war. We shall justify this last right on the ground that the president as chief of the whole army of the country must have it at his disposal, in case of need for the defense of the new republican constitution, the right to defend which will belong to him as the responsible representative of this constitution.

14. It is easy to understand them in these conditions the key of the shrine will lie in our hands, and no one outside ourselves will any longer direct the force of legislation.

15. Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the Chamber the right of interpolation on government measures, on the pretext of preserving political secrecy, (see below)

and, further, we shall by the new constitution reduce the number of representatives to a minimum, thereby proportionately reducing political passions and the passion for politics. If, however, they should, which is hardly to be expected, burst into flame, even in this minimum, we shall nullify them by a stirring appeal and a reference to the majority of the whole people ... Upon the president will depend the appointment of presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber and the Senate. Instead of constant sessions of Parliaments we shall reduce their sittings to a few months. Moreover, the president, as chief of the executive power, will have the right to summon and dissolve Parliament, and, in the latter case, to prolong the time for the appointment of a new parliamentary assembly. But in order that the consequences of all these acts which in substance are illegal, should not, prematurely for our plans, upon the responsibility established by use of the president, WE SHALL INSTIGATE MINISTERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE HIGHER ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT TO EVADE HIS DISPOSITIONS BY TAKING MEASURES OF THEIR OWN, for doing which they will be made the scapegoats in his place ... This part we especially recommend to be given to be played by the Senate, the Council of State, or the Council of Ministers, but not to an individual official.

16. The president will, at our discretion, interpret the sense of such of the existing laws as admit of various

"if it is a secret, it is a lie "

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION:

Critics: Bush tightens release of presidential papers

WASHINGTON (AP) _ One historian calls it a "disaster for history," but the White House insists a new executive order issued by President Bush balances the public's right to see the records of past presidents with a need to protect national security.

Advocates for the release of government documents say the executive order violates the spirit of the 1978 Presidential Records Act and will usher in a new era of secrecy for papers left behind by America's chief executives.

The White House says the order simply sets up a procedure for implementing the act and gives former presidents more authority to claim executive privilege to withhold certain papers. Absent "compelling" circumstances, the incumbent president will agree with a former president's decision to disclose or withhold documents, the White House said.

Bruce Craig, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, claims the order is "blatantly unlawful top to bottom." He predicted a quick legal challenge to the order, which probably will come up at a hearing Nov. 6 by a House Government Reform subcommittee. The hearing was scheduled for last month but was canceled after the Sept. 11 terror attacks.

Craig said that under the order, if a former president says certain papers are privileged, they will remain secret even if the sitting president disagrees. Conversely, if a sitting president says certain papers from a past administration are privileged, they will remain under wraps even if the former president disagrees.

In a letter, Bruce Lindsey, lawyer for the William J. Clinton Foundation, said the former president objects to Bush's executive order because laws already exist to restrict disclosure of sensitive documents, The Washington Post reported Nov. 2.

The act affects the presidential papers of Clinton, Bush's father and Ronald Reagan. It also applies to vice presidential papers, including those of former President Bush.

Reagan's papers are the first governed by the Presidential Records Act, which followed Watergate and Richard Nixon's attempts to hold on to his papers and tape recordings. The act made presidential records the property of government, not ex-presidents.

Some 68,000 pages of Reagan's White House records, including vice presidential papers from the elder Bush, were supposed to have been opened under the law in January, 12 years after Reagan left office. The White House delayed the release three times to review constitutional and legal questions; the Nov. 1 executive order resulted.

White House counsel Alberto Gonzales defended the president's executive order but did not say when the Reagan papers would be opened to the public.

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the order provides a "safety valve" for a current administration. A former president, out of office for 12 years, might not recognize national security implications of releasing certain documents, he said.

Fleischer emphasized that "except in very compelling cases, if a former president were to say `That (document) should go out,' this administration would say, "It should go out."

Moreover, any claims of executive privilege, including those involving military, diplomatic or national security secrets, legal work or advice, presidential communications or the deliberative processes of the president and his advisers, can be appealed in court, Gonzales said.

Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' government secrecy project, thinks the order will make it harder for the public to gain access to historically valuable presidential papers because both the former president and the incumbent must consent to disclosure

 

 

U.S. dependence on increasingly sophisticated and more concentrated critical infrastructures has increased dramatically over the past decade. Electrical utilities, water and sewage systems, transportation networks, and communications and energy systems now depend on computers to provide safe, efficient, and reliable service. The banking and finance sector, too, keeps track of millions of transactions through increasingly robust computer capabilities.

thanks to Y2k Hoax and the set up of the beast marking system they now have the world under Satanic World Order.

 

The overwhelming majority of these computer systems are privately owned, and many operate at or very near capacity with little or no provision for manual back-ups in an emergency.

 

Moreover, the computerized information networks that link systems together are themselves vulnerable to unwanted intrusion and disruption. An attack on any one of several highly interdependent networks can cause collateral damage to other networks and the systems they connect. Some forms of disruption will lead merely to nuisance and economic loss, but other forms will jeopardize lives. One need only note the dependence of hospitals, air-traffic control systems, and the food processing industry on computer controls to appreciate the point.

 

The bulk of unclassified military communications, too, relies on systems almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector. Yet little has been done to assure the security and reliability of those communications in crisis. Current efforts to prevent attacks, protect against their most damaging effects, and prepare for prompt response are uneven at best, and this is dangerous because a determined adversary is most likely to employ a weapon of mass destruction during a homeland security or foreign policy crisis.

 

As noted above, a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure Protection would be an integral part of the National Homeland Security Agency. This directorate would have two vital responsibilities. First would be to oversee the physical assets and information networks that make up the U.S. critical infrastructure. It should ensure the maintenance of a nucleus of cyber security expertise within the government, as well. There is now an alarming shortage of government cyber security experts due in large part to the financial attraction of private-sector employment that the government cannot match under present personnel procedures.*13 The director's second responsibility, would be as the Critical Information Technology, Assurance, and Security Office (CITASO). This office would coordinate efforts to address the nation's vulnerability to electronic or physical attacks on critical infrastructure.

 

Several critical activities that are currently spread among various government agencies should be brought together for this purpose. These include:

 

· Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are government-sponsored committees of private-sector participants who work to share information, plans, and procedures for information security in their fields;

 

· The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), currently housed in the Commerce Department, which develops outreach and awareness programs with the private sector;

 

 

· The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), currently housed in the FBI, which gathers information and provides warnings of cyber attacks; and

 

· The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), which is designed to coordinate and support research and development projects on cyber security.

 

In partnership with the private sector where most cyber assets are developed and owned, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate would be responsible for enhancing information sharing on cyber and physical security, tracking vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk management policies, and delineating the roles of various government agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks. To do this, the government needs to institutionalize better its private-sector liaison across the board-with the owners and operators of critical infrastructures, hardware and software developers, server/service providers, manufacturers/producers, and applied technology developers.

see. www.samliquidation.com/wallstreet.htm

 

 

The Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate's work with the private sector must include a strong advocacy of greater government and corporate investment in information assurance and security. The CITASO would be the focal point for coordinating with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in helping to establish cyber policy, standards, and enforcement mechanisms. Working closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its Chief Information Officer Council (CIO Council), the CITASO needs to speak for those interests in government councils.*14 The CITASO must also provide incentives for private-sector participation in Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to share information on threats, vulnerabilities, and individual incidents, to identify interdependencies, and to map the potential cascading effects of outages in various sectors.

Excerpt from "Protocols"

2. The administrators, whom we shall choose from among the public, with strict regard to their capacities for servile obedience, will not be persons trained in the arts of government, and will therefore easily become pawns in our game in the hands of men of learning and genius who will be their advisers, specialists bred and reared from early childhood to rule the affairs of the whole world

 

The directorate also needs to help coordinate cyber security issues internationally. At present, the FCC handles international cyber issues for the U.S. government through the International Telecommunications Union. (and you don't think you are watched)

As this is one of many related international issues, it would be unwise to remove this responsibility from the FCC. Nevertheless, the CIP Directorate should work closely with the FCC on cyber issues in international bodies.

The mission of the NHSA must include some specific planning and operational tasks to be staffed through the Directorate for Emergency Preparedness and Response.

 

These include:

 

· Setting training and equipment standards, providing resource grants, and encouraging intelligence and information sharing among state emergency management officials, local first responders, the Defense Department, and the FBI;

 

· Integrating the various activities of the Defense Department, the National Guard, and other federal agencies into the Federal Response Plan; and

Federalize National Guard

 

· Pulling together private sector activities, including those of the medical community, on recovery, consequence management, and planning for continuity of services.

medical, federalized watchman

 

Working with state officials, the emergency management community, and the law enforcement community, the job of NHSA's third directorate will be to rationalize and refine the nation's incident response system. The current distinction between crisis management and consequence management is neither sustainable nor wise. The duplicative command arrangements that have been fostered by this division are prone to confusion and delay. NHSA should develop and manage a single response system for national incidents, in close coordination with the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the FBI. This would require that the current policy, which specifies initial DoJ control in terrorist incidents on U.S. territory, be amended once Congress creates NHSA. We believe that this arrangement would in no way contradict or diminish the FBI's traditional role with respect to law enforcement.

Excerpt From "Protocols"

1. The intensification of armaments, the increase of police forces - are all essential for the completion of the aforementioned plans. What we have to get at is that there should be in all the States of the world, besides ourselves, only the masses of the proletariat, a few millionaires devoted to our interests, police and soldiers.

 

Finally, but perhaps most critically, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate will need to assume a major resource and budget role. With the help of the Office of Management and Budget, the directorate's first task will be to figure out what is being spent on homeland security in the various departments and agencies. Only with such an overview can the nation identify the shortfalls between capabilities and requirements. Such a mission budget should be included in the President's overall budget submission to Congress. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate will also maintain federal asset databases and encourage and support up-to-date state and local databases.

Origin of term "Directorate"

"The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and Reich Kommissar for Prussia stated that it was of decisive importance to co- ordinate into the new State the masses standing behind the parties. The question of the incorporation of political Catholicism into the new State was of particular importance."

That was a statement made by von Papen at the meeting at which the Enabling Act (Executive Order?)was discussed, prior to Hitler's speech on the Enabling Act (Homeland Security Equivalent) in which he gave his assurance to the Church.

On 20 July 1933 Papen signed the Reich Concordat negotiated by him with the Vatican. The Tribunal has already taken judicial notice of this as Document 3280-A-PS. The signing of the Concordat, like Hitler's Papen-inspired speech on the Enabling Act, was only an interlude in the church policy of the Nazi conspirators (Talmudic Babylonian Baal Worshippers). Their policy of assurances was followed by a long series of violations which eventually resulted in Papal denunciation in the Encyclical "Mit brennender Sorge," which is Document 3476-PS, Exhibit USA 567.

Papen maintains that his actions regarding the Church were sincere, and he has asserted, during interrogations, that it was Hitler who sabotaged the Concordat. If von Papen really believed in the very solemn undertakings given by him on behalf of the Reich to the Vatican, I submit it is strange that he, himself a Catholic, should have continued to serve Hitler after all those violations and even after the Papal Encyclical itself. I will go further. I will say that Papen was himself involved in what was virtually, if not technically, a violation of the Concordat. The Tribunal will recollect the Allocution of the Pope, dated 2 June 1945, which is Document 3268-PS, Exhibit USA 356, from which, on Page 1647 of the transcript Colonel Storey read the Pope's own summary of the Nazis' bitter struggle against the Church. (Part 3, p. 50). The very first item the Pope mentioned was the dissolution of Catholic organisations and, if the Tribunal will look at Document 3376-PS on Page 56 of the English document book, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 244 and which is an extract

[Page 105]

"The Reich Directorate of the Party announces the self- dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans.

Since the Reich Directorate of the Party, through its Department for Cultural Peace, directly, and to an increasing extent, administers all cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State and Churches, the tasks at first delegated in the Union of Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Directorate of the Party in the interest of a stronger co-ordination.

 

FEMA has adapted well to new circumstances over the past few years and has gained a well-deserved reputation for responsiveness to both natural and manmade disasters. While taking on homeland security responsibilities, the proposed NHSA would strengthen FEMA's ability to respond to such disasters. It would streamline the federal apparatus and provide greater support to the state and local officials who, as the nation's first responders, possess enormous expertise. To the greatest extent possible, federal programs should build upon the expertise and existing programs of state emergency preparedness systems and help promote regional compacts to share resources and capabilities.

 

To help simplify federal support mechanisms, we recommend transferring the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), currently housed at the FBI, to the National Homeland Security Agency. The Commission believes that this transfer to FEMA should be done at first opportunity, even before NHSA is up and running. The NDPO would be tasked with organizing the training of local responders and providing local and state authorities with equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in a WMD emergency. NHSA would develop the policies, requirements, and priorities as part of its planning tasks as well as oversee the various federal, state, and local training and exercise programs. In this way, a single staff would provide federal assistance for any emergency, whether it is caused by flood, earthquake, hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb.

Capitalizing on a "Crisis"

Although Germany's Nazi (National Socialist) Party was a collection of squalid criminals, it found favor with the German public by promising "law and order." On February 27, 1933 (shortly after Hitler became chancellor), the Reichstag building was set afire. Although it was (and remains) unclear whether the fire was set by a communist saboteur or a Nazi agent provocateur, the Nazis capitalized upon the incident. Insisting that the Reichstag fire prefigured a communist onslaught against the German state, Hitler persuaded President Hindenburg to sign an emergency decree suspending constitutional liberties and allowing the state to exercise extraordinary powers in the name of "public safety."

Hitler and his comrades cultivated the impression that Germany was undergoing a crisis of criminality. As a remedy for the supposed crisis, Hitler proposed a program of Gleichschaltung (coordination or synchronization), through which the central government would absorb the power and political functions of the German states. On March 23, 1933, the Reichstag passed the "Enabling Act" (also called the "Law for Removing the Distress of People and Reich"), which made the central government responsible for all law enforcement in the German Reich. Hitler sought to placate critics of the measure by issuing assurances that this enrichment of the state's power would not lead to abuses:

The government will make use of these powers only insofar as they are essential for carrying out vitally necessary measures .... The separate existence of the federal states will not be done away .... The number of cases in which an internal necessity exists for having recourse to such a law is in itself a limited one.

Of course, these assurances were utterly useless. Leftist historian William Shirer pointed out, "It was this Enabling Act alone which formed the legal basis for Hitler's dictatorship. From March 23, 1933 ... Hitler was the dictator of the Reich, freed of any restraint by Parliament" or the country's constitution. With astonishing efficiency, the Nazi state devoured the legal and constitutional authorities of all intermediate governments in Germany. As Shirer noted, within a short time the Nazi Party formalized the completion of a unified police state:

... on June 16, 1936, for the first time in German history, a unified police was established for the whole of the Reich -- previously the police had been organized separately by each of the states -- and Himmler was put in charge as Chief of the German Police. This was tantamount to putting the police in the hands of the S.S., which since its suppression of the Roehm "revolt" in 1934 had been rapidly increasing its power .... The Third Reich, as is inevitable in the development of all totalitarian dictatorships, had become a police state.

Hitler's National Socialist police state was indebted to the pioneering work of Lenin's communist regime. On December 20, 1917, the Soviet government created the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage," or Cheka, and appointed Feliks Dzerzhinsky, a man of singular ruthlessness, as its head. Notes historian John Barron, "Formation of the Cheka was not accompanied by any announcement of its powers and purposes" -- that is, the body was given unspecified and unsupervised powers. On February 6, 1922, the body was renamed the GPU (State Political Directorate) and placed under the authority of the NKVD, or "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs," which also controlled the conventional police

America's Reichstag? Twin Trade Centers?

A WMD incident on American soil is likely to overwhelm local fire and rescue squads, medical facilities, and government services. Attacks may contaminate water, food, and air; large- scale evacuations may be necessary and casualties could be extensive. Since getting prompt help to those who need it would be a complex and massive operation requiring federal support, such operations must be extensively planned in advance. Responsibilities need to be assigned and procedures put in place for these responsibilities to evolve if the situation worsens. As we envision it, state officials will take the initial lead (Giuliani?) in responding to a crisis. NHSA will normally use its Regional Directors to coordinate federal assistance, while the National Crisis Action Center will monitor ongoing operations and requirements. Should a crisis overwhelm local assets, state officials will turn to NHSA for additional federal assistance. In major crises, upon the recommendation of the civilian Director of NHSA, the President will designate a senior figure-a Federal Coordinating Officer-to assume direction of all federal activities on the scene. If the situation warrants, a state governor can ask that active military forces reinforce National Guard units already on the scene.(Pitakis?) Once the President federalizes National Guard forces, or if he decides to use Reserve forces, the Joint Forces Command will assume responsibility for all military operations, acting through designated task force commanders. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense would appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer to provide civilian oversight and ensure prompt civil support. This person would work for the Federal Coordinating Officer. This response mechanism is displayed in Figure 2.

worked like a charm, didn't it?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2: Emergency Response Mechanisms

 

To be capable of carrying out its responsibilities under extreme circumstances, NHSA will need to undertake robust exercise programs and regular training to gain experience and to establish effective command and control procedures. It will be essential to update regularly the Federal Response Plan. It will be especially critical for NHSA officials to undertake detailed planning and exercises for the full range of potential contingencies, including ones that require the substantial involvement of military assets in support.

 

NHSA will provide the overarching structure for homeland security, but other government agencies will retain specific homeland security tasks. We take the necessary obligations of the major ones in turn.

 

Intelligence Community. Good intelligence is the key to preventing attacks on the homeland and homeland security should become one of the intelligence community's most important missions.*15 Better human intelligence must supplement technical intelligence, especially on terrorist groups covertly supported by states. As noted above, fuller cooperation and more extensive information-sharing with friendly governments will also improve the chances that would-be perpetrators will be detained, arrested, and prosecuted before they ever reach U.S. borders.

 

 

The intelligence community also needs to embrace cyber threats as a legitimate mission and to incorporate intelligence gathering on potential strategic threats from abroad into its activities.

 

To advance these ends, we offer the following recommendation:

· 4: The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats.

 

Department of State. U.S. embassies overseas are the American people's first line of defense. U.S. Ambassadors must make homeland security a top priority for all embassy staff, and Ambassadors need the requisite authority to ensure that information is shared in a way that maximizes advance warning overseas of direct threats to the United States.

 

Ambassadors should also ensure that the gathering of information, and particularly from open sources, takes full advantage of all U.S. government resources abroad, including State Department diplomats, consular officers, military officers, and representatives of the various other departments and agencies. The State Department should also strengthen its efforts to acquire information from Americans living or travelling abroad in private capacities.

 

The State Department has made good progress in its overseas efforts to reduce terrorism, but we now need to extend this effort into the Information Age. Working with NHSA's CIP Directorate, the State Department should expand cooperation on critical infrastructure protection with other states and international organizations. Private sector initiatives, particularly in the banking community, provide examples of international cooperation on legal issues, standards, and practices. Working with the CIP Directorate and the FCC, the State Department should also encourage other nations to criminalize hacking and electronic intrusions and to help track hackers, computer virus proliferators, and cyber terrorists.

Do not forget United Nations ratifications on xenophobia and intolerance which will be considered as hate crimes. Especially those who cause the children to err, those who call themselves Jew but are liars and of the synagogues of Satan.

Department of Defense. The Defense Department, which has placed its highest priority on preparing for major theater war, should pay far more attention to the homeland security mission. Organizationally, DoD responses are widely dispersed. An Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support has responsibility for WMD incidents, while the Department of the Army's Director of Military Support is responsible for non-WMD contingencies. Such an arrangement does not provide clear lines of authority and responsibility or ensure political accountability. The Commission therefore recommends the following:

 

· 5: The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary.

 

U.S. CONCENTRATION CAMPS
FEMA AND THE REX 84 PROGRAM

over 600 prison camps in the United States, all fully operational and ready to receive prisoners. They are all staffed and even surrounded by full-time guards, but they are all empty. These camps are to be operated by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) should Martial Law need to be implemented in the United States. The current foreseeable event which will see the implementation of the use of these camps is the coming of the New World Order, led by the Shadow Government.

The Rex 84 Program was established on the reasoning that if a mass exodus of illegal aliens crossed the Mexican/US border, they would be quickly rounded up and detained in detention centers by FEMA. Rex 84 allowed many military bases to be closed down and to be turned into prisons.

Operation Cable Splicer and Garden Plot are the two sub programs which will be implemented once the Rex 84 program is initiated for its proper purpose. Garden Plot is the program to control the population. Cable Splicer is the program for an orderly takeover of the state and local governments by the federal government. FEMA is the executive arm of the coming police state and thus will head up all operations. The Presidential Executive Orders already listed on the Federal Register also are part of the legal framework for this operation.

The camps all have railroad facilities as well as roads leading to and from the detention facilities. Many also have an airport nearby. The majority of the camps can house a population of 20,000 prisoners. Currently, the largest of these facilities is just outside of Fairbanks, Alaska. The Alaskan facility is a massive mental health facility and can hold approximately 2 million people.

This shows the North Eastern section of the U.S., and shows a closer look, where U.N. troops are located in North Western Montana, and a few other states as well.

The Family Alliance

The Yale Skull & Bones Secret Society Club which George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush

Skull and Bones is a Masonic Order regardless of whether Grand Lodge Masonry openly recognizes it or not. It's 'Charter of Transmission' came from the 'Brotherhood of Death' at Inglostadt Germany, an offshoot of Contintental Freemason Baron Von Hund's 'Strict Observance' Rite, who was also instrumental in the founding of the Illuminati of Bavaria.

A Journalists Introduction to Skull and Bones

This brief introduction to Skull and Bones is dedicated to those journalists in America who have both the courage and the ability to inform the public regarding what others may consider to be a taboo subject -- a foreign-born secret society that has exported itself to this nation and may succeed in securing the highest office in the land for still another of its sworn initiates. The two main characters in this story so far are Antony C. Sutton and David Armstrong. The first is a scholar of the first order to began the definitive work on this subject and then vanished. The second came to Texas from California, became the editor of the most liberal Texas magazine, wrote a series of very insightful articles on the Bush family and then, like Sutton, was apparently muzzled.

INTRODUCTION

In May of 1994 a Texas Monthly story (p. 146) by Skip Hollandsworth, on George W. Bush, briefly stated: "Although he did not graduate Phi Beta Kappa as his father had, he did follow his father into the university's Skull and Bones Club, a secret society for the males of prominent families."

The majority of Bonesmen are from old-line Puritan families. They include the following families: Whitney, Lord, Phelps. Wadsworth, Allen, Bundy, Adams, Stimson, Taft, Gilman and Perkins. A second group of families in the Skull & Bones are: Harriman, Rockefeller, Payne, Davison, Pillsbury and Weyerhauser. The Order of Skull and Bones was once called the "Brotherhood of Death."(1)

At any given time, only about 600 or so members of the Order are alive. Of that number only 150 (about one-quarter) take an active role in the society. It is estimated that a core of perhaps 20-30 families run the Order. Recent Bones inductees include a few blacks, gays, and even some foreign students. In 1991 Skull and Bones began to admit women members. Each initiate gets \$15,000 and a grandfather clock. A neophyte's name is changed to Knight so and so. The old Knights are known as Patriarchs. Outsiders are known as Gentiles and vandals. It meets annually-patriarchs only-on Deer Island in the St. Lawrence River.(2)

THE SECRECY OF BONES

"Initiates are sworn to secrecy. They are required to leave the room if The Order comes into discussion. They cannot-under oath-answer questions on The Order and its organization." -- Antony C. Sutton(3)

The Senior secret societies at Yale, wrote Lymann Bogg, "never mention their names."(4) Not even the inquisitive Pamela Churchill Harriman could get her third husband to talk about Bones: "(Averell) Harriman regularly went back to the tomb (the Bone's Temple) on High Street, once even lamenting that his duties as chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks prevented him from attending a reunion. So complete was his trust in Bone's code of secrecy that in conversations at annual dinners he spoke openly about national security affairs. He refused, however, to tell his family anything about Bones. Soon after she became Harriman's third wife in 1971, Pamela Churchill Harriman received an odd letter addressing her by a name spelled in hieroglyphics. 'Oh, that's Bones,' Harriman said. 'I must tell you about that sometime. Uh, I mean I can't tell you about that.'"(5)

UNIVERSITIES AS SPAWNING GROUNDS OF THREE DIFFERENT SECRET SOCIETIES

Between 1983-1986, the British-born conspiracy scholar Antony C. Sutton wrote a series of pamphlets about the Order of Skull & Bones. Sutton said that his series was "based on several sources, including contemporary 'moles.'"(6) The short pamphlets were compiled into one volume and published as a book in 1986. Sutton noted that secret societies had been organized at three universities: "The Illuminati was founded at (the) University of Ingolstadt. The (Cecil Rhodes) Group was founded at All Souls College, Oxford University in England, and the Order was founded at Yale University in the United States."(7) He noted: "The paradox is that institutions supposedly devoted to the search for truth and freedom have given birth to institutions devoted to world enslavement."

BUT, WHAT'S WRONG WITH SECRET SOCIETIES?

Sutton's "magnum opus" laid out his views regarding secret societies: "Secret political organizations can be-and have been-extremely dangerous to the social health and constitutional validity of a society. In a truly free society the exercise of political power must always be open and known."(8) He then stated: "Moreover, organizations devoted to violent overthrow of political structures have always, by necessity, been secret organizations. Communist revolutionary cells are an obvious example. In fact, such revolutionary organizations can only function if their existence was secret."(9) Further, said Sutton: "In brief, secrecy in matters political is historically associated with coercion. Furthermore, the existence of secrecy in organizations with political ambitions or with a history of political actions is always suspect. Freedom is always associated with open political action and discussion while coercion is always associated with secrecy."(10)

A pamphlet on Bones described the walls of the tomb as "adorned with pictures of the founders of Bones at Yale and of the members of the Society in Germany when the Chapter was established here in 1832."(11) Sutton asked: "Think about this: Skull and Bones is not American at all. It is a branch of a FOREIGN secret society."(12) Sutton concluded that Skull and Bones "is a clear and obvious threat to constitutional freedom in the United States. Its secrecy, power and use of influence is greater by far than the masons, or any other semi-secret mutual or fraternal organization."(13)

SUTTON COMPARED BONES TO THE BAVARIAN ILLUMINATI

While critics concede that the Illuminati "was an actual group that existed from 1776 until 1785..." it is also explained that: "Given the fact that Weishaupt's ideas ran counter to the authoritarian, church-intertwined-with-state power structure, he was forced to keep his Illuminati secret and work through Masonic lodges. He was not successful."(14)

Sutton made numerous tentative comparisons between the Illuminati and Bones. Each member, according to a 1876 anonymous satire, has an "inside name" and "these names bear a remarkable resemblance to those used by the Illuminati, e.g., Chilo, Eumenes, Glaucus, Pristicus and Arbaces."(15) He added: "During its time, the Illuminati had widespread and influential membership. After suppression by the Bavarian Government in 1788 it was quiet for some years and then reportedly revived."(16) Sutton promised that "in a subsequent book, we will trace the order to the Illuminati..."(17) Also, Sutton stated: "The significance of this study is that the methods and objectives (of the Illuminati) parallel those of the Order. In fact, infiltration of the Illuminati into New England is known and will be the topic of a forthcoming volume."(18) He later wrote: "At this point we want to draw a comparison between the Order known as Skull and Bones and The Order known as Illuminati in 18th century Bavaria. This is not the time and place to draw final conclusions."(19) Sutton noted that "It (Bones) was introduced into the United States by William Russell, later General William Russell, who brought a charter back from his student days in Germany."(20) [So far a check of Russell's biographies has revealed no hint of a German education]. When the Skull and Bones "Temple" was raided in 1876 a card was found that read: "From the German Chapter. Presented by Patriarch D.C. Gilman of D. 50."(21) The Yale Bones catalogs indicate that Skull and Bones began in the U.S. in the 3rd decade of the second period of the organization. The first decade of the second period would be 1800 with the first period being 1790-1800: "That places us in the time frame of the elimination of Illuminati by the Bavarian Elector."(22)

Two years later Sutton, in 1988, wrote The Two Faces of George Bush. In this work he identified George W. Bush as a Bonesman like his soon-to-be President father. Sutton has not written further on the Order. At least one close associate claimed that Sutton became and remains "a fugitive in his own adopted country."

EDITOR OF TEXAS OBSERVER, DAVID ARMSTRONG, LASTS EIGHT MONTHS

On March 22, 1991, a crusading journalist named David Armstrong became the editor of the Texas Observer. His career at the most liberal and outspoken Texas magazine lasted just over eight months. On April 5, 1991, he wrote an article entitled "The Great S&L Robbery: Spookbuster Pete Brewton Tells All." On July 26, 1991 another article by Armstrong was entitled: "Oil in the Family." On September 20, 1991, Armstrong wrote another piece entitled: "Global Entanglements." The cover featured a cartoon of George "W" Bush with "Harken" on his head and CIA agents (spies) all around him.

On November 29, 1991 David Armstrong's name appeared on the masthead of the Texas Observer for the last time. Armstrong deplored and described what he termed a trend of preemptive journalism: "Mainstream media have never demonstrated a keen interest in challenging the status quo. Contrary to the popular image of an independent and adversarial press, U.S. corporate media are, in fact, little more than lackeys for elite interests."

Armstrong also blasted criticism of Stone's JFK movie prior to the scenes even being shot. He criticized Times Harken coverage as "half-measures." His last Texas Observer words were: "Time's handling of the Harken story is just one more example of the disturbing trend toward preemptive journalism. The consequences of this practice are serious indeed, for it has the potential to not only diffuse and obscure information, but to prevent it from ever being debated in the public arena at all. Unlike the alternative press, mainstream sources are widely available and well indexed. For that reason, they are widely cited and help shape official history. Twenty years from now when George W. Bush is running for president, researchers and journalists interested in his business activities in Texas will likely turn to Time magazine and other mainstream sources of their information. But if they're interested in reading the whole story, they'll have to look elsewhere."(23)

Thus ended David Armstrong's editorship at the Texas Observer. It is believed that there was a last conversation between Armstrong and his publisher but no explanation was ever written that explained his departure to the Observer's readership. Armstrong's prophecy of a run for the presidency by George "W" Bush has now come true. But his pen is no longer telling more of the real Bush story.

_____________________________

 

A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security would provide policy oversight for the various DoD activities in the homeland security mission and insure that mechanisms are in place for coordinating military support in major emergencies. He or she would work to integrate homeland security into Defense Department planning, and ensure that adequate resources are forthcoming. This Assistant Secretary would also represent the Secretary in the NSC interagency process on homeland security issues.

 

Along similar lines and for similar reasons, we also recommend that the Defense Department broaden and strengthen the existing Joint Forces Command/Joint Task Force- Civil Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate military planning, doctrine, and command and control for military support for all hazards and disasters.

 

This task force should be directed by a senior National Guard general with additional headquarters personnel. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JTF-CS should contain several rapid reaction task forces, composed largely of rapidly mobilizable National Guard units. The task force should have command and control capabilities for multiple incidents. Joint Forces Command should work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to ensure the provision of adequate resources and appropriate force allocations, training, and equipment for civil support.

 

On the prevention side, maintaining strong nuclear and conventional forces is as high a priority for homeland security as it is for other missions. Shaping a peaceful international environment and deterring hostile military actors remain sound military goals. But deterrent forces may have little effect on non-state groups secretly supported by states, or individuals with grievances real or imagined. In cases of clear and imminent danger, the military must be able to take preemptive action overseas in circumstances where local authorities are unable or unwilling to act. For this purpose, the United States needs to be prepared to use its rapid, long-range precision strike capabilities. A decision to act would obviously rest in civilian hands, and would depend on intelligence information and assessments of diplomatic consequences. But even if a decision to strike preemptively is never taken or needed, the capability should be available nonetheless, for knowledge of it can contribute to deterrence.

Excerpt from "Protocols"

1. The intensification of armaments, the increase of police forces - are all essential for the completion of the aforementioned plans. What we have to get at is that there should be in all the States of the world, besides ourselves, only the masses of the proletariat, a few millionaires devoted to our interests, police and soldiers.

 

We also suggest that the Defense Department broaden its mission of protecting air, sea, and land approaches to the United States, consistent with emerging threats such as the potential proliferation of cruise missiles. (Controversial, SDI Defense Initiative) The department should examine alternative means of monitoring approaches to the territorial United States. Modern information technology and sophisticated sensors can help monitor the high volumes of traffic to and from the United States. Given the volume of legitimate activities near and on the border, even modern information technology and remote sensors cannot filter the good from the bad as a matter of routine. It is neither wise nor possible to create a surveillance umbrella over the United States. But Defense Department assets can be used to support detection, monitoring, and even interception operations when intelligence indicates a specific threat.

 

Finally, a better division of labor and understanding of responsibilities is essential in dealing with the connectivity and interdependence of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. This includes addressing the nature of a national transportation network or cyber emergency and the Defense Department's role in prevention, detection, or protection of the national critical infrastructure. The department's sealift and airlift plans are premised on largely unquestioned assumptions that domestic transportation systems will be fully available to support mobilization requirements. 

 

The department also is paying insufficient attention to the vulnerability of its information networks. Currently, the department's computer network defense task force (JTF- Computer Network Defense) is underfunded and understaffed for the task of managing an actual strategic information warfare attack. It should be given the resources and capability to carry out its current mission and is a logical source of advice to the proposed NHSA Critical Information Technology, Assurance, and Security Office.

keyboard tracking

 

National Guard. The National Guard, whose origins are to be found in the state militias authorized by the U.S. Constitution, should play a central role in the response component of a layered defense strategy for homeland security. We therefore recommend the following:

Relieve them from constitution and federalize them, once this is done, there will be no defense but to throw rocks, if that is what you feel you may need do.

 

· 6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, (PDD executive orders) should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.

At present, the Army National Guard is primarily organized and equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas. In this the Guard fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active military during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the Guard carries out many state- level missions for disaster and humanitarian relief, as well as consequence management. For these, it relies upon the discipline, equipment, and leadership of its combat forces. The National Guard should redistribute resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for conventional wars overseas to provide greater support to civil authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters, especially emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

Or in case the civilians rebel?

 

Such a redistribution should flow from a detailed assessment of force requirements for both theater war and homeland security contingencies. The Department of Defense should conduct such an assessment, with the participation of the state governors and the NHSA Director. In setting requirements, the department should minimize having forces with dual missions or relying on active forces detailed for major theater war. This is because the United States will need to maintain a heightened deterrent and defensive posture against homeland attacks during regional contingencies abroad. The most likely timing of a major terrorist incident will be while the United States is involved in a conflict overseas.*16

keep your eye (pun) on this 

 

The National Guard is designated as the primary Department of Defense agency for disaster relief. In many cases, the National Guard will respond as a state asset under the control of state governors. While it is appropriate for the National Guard to play the lead military role in managing the consequences of a WMD attack, its capabilities to do so are uneven and in some cases its forces are not adequately structured or equipped. Twenty-two WMD Civil Support Teams, made up of trained and equipped full-time National Guard personnel, will be ready to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders, provide technical advice, and pave the way for additional military help. These teams fill a vital need, but more effort is required.

 

This Commission recommends that the National Guard be reorganized to fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of homeland security. It should provide a mobilization base with strong local ties and support. It is already "forward deployed" to achieve this mission and should: · Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state, local, and regional planning for responding to a WMD incident;

This is not what the constitution had in mind for National Guard

 

· Train and help organize local first responders;

 

· Maintain up-to-date inventories of military resources and equipment available in the area on short notice;

 

· Plan for rapid inter-state support and reinforcement; and

 

· Develop an overseas capability for international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

 

In this way, the National Guard will become a critical asset for homeland security. Medical Community. The medical community has critical roles to play in homeland security. Catastrophic acts of terrorism or violence could cause casualties far beyond any imagined heretofore. Most of the American medical system is privately owned and now operates at close to capacity. An incident involving WMD will quickly overwhelm the capacities of local hospitals and emergency management professionals.

 

In response, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the Department of Health and Human Services have already begun a reassessment of their programs. Research to develop better diagnostic equipment and immune-enhancing drugs is underway, and resources to reinvigorate U.S. epidemiological surveillance capacity have been allocated. Programs to amass and regionally distribute inventories of antibiotics and vaccines have started, (well before anthrax scare after Sept.11,2001) 

 

and arrangements for mass production of selected pharmaceuticals have been made.

understand that they knew before hand that Cipro would be needed

 

 The Centers for Disease Control has rapid-response investigative units prepared to deploy and respond to incidents. These programs will enhance the capacities of the medical community, but the momentum and resources for this effort must be extended. We recommend that the NHSA Directorate for Emergency Preparedness and Response assess local and federal medical resources to deal with a WMD emergency. It should then specify those medical programs needed to deal with a major national emergency beyond the means of the private sector, and Congress should fund those needs.

 

 

C. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION

 

Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an Executive Branch problem.

 

Congress can and should be an active participant in the development of homeland security programs, as well. Its hearings can help develop the best ideas and solutions. Individual members should develop expertise in homeland security policy and its implementation so that they can fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and advice in times of crisis. Most important, using its power of the purse, Congress should help to ensure that government agencies have sufficient resources and that their programs are coordinated, efficient, and effective.

Tax Relief?

 

Congress has already taken important steps. 

keep in mind this commission report was released Jan. 2001

 

 

Homeland Security Part 2

 

 

"It is Written"

The Last Deception

Section 2

  section 3   

section 4 

  section 5  

section 6  

section 7 

  section 8 

section  9     

section 10  

section 11  

section 12  

section 13 

section 14 "The Protocols of the Illuminated Elders of Tzion"

  section 15 

      section 16 "The Beast Has Risen" 

 section 16-B

 section 17  

  section 17-B  

  section 17-C   

section 17-D

  section 18    

section 18-B

section 19    

section 19-B

section 20  

 section 20-B 

  section 20-C 

  section 20-D 

  section 20-E

section 21 

  section 22  

section 23

section 24

section 25

Daniel's Seventy Weeks

Was Peter a Jew?

The Two Witnesses

"The Whore of Babylon"

Mystery Babylon

 Are the " Ael-ians coming"

Ael-ians II

Wall Street " The Mark" is Here

Wall Street II

Wall Street III

It has happened "War Declared upon and in America"

Declared section Part II

"Questions"

"All you ever need to know about their god and Qabalah"

Qabalah Part II

Qabalah Part III

National Identification Card

Prophecy Unfolding

A Sincere Request to  "Rapture" Teachers

"Seventh Trumpet"

Compulsory Constitutional Cremation

Homeland Security, "The Police State"

"The Fourth Beast"

The Babylonian Talmudic Mystical Qabalah

The Scribes of Baal

How will they do it- " The false-christ"

False Christ Part II

The Word

Baal's food Tax

"The Changing of the Guards"

"Summation" The beginning of sorrows has begun

"Moshiach ben Lucifer"

Satan's Tales "Wagging the Global Dog"

"Satan's Plan", Protocols of Zion ( of course they will dispute it's authenticity)

I Witch, New One World Order Seal

Satan's Enforcers of Quaballah

Satan's Enforcers Part 2

Satan's Enforcers Part 3

Satan's Enforcers Part 4

The Seed of God or the Seed of Satan, Your choice by faith

Pledge of Allegiance Part Two

I AM, the Revelation of Jesus Christ

King of the Noachides

"Beware the Mark"

"Beware the Mark" part two

"Beware the Mark" Part 3

"Beware the Mark" Part Four

"Beware the Mark" Part Five

 Harvest of Fear

"Harvest of Fear" Part Two

"Harvest of Fear" Part Three

National Organization Against Hasidic International Talmudic Enforcement

Where's Da Plane Boss, wheres da plane?

The Tarot Card Killer of Olam Ha Ba

The "Lessor Jew"

Temporary Coup d' Etat

The Federal Reserve, Fed up with the Fed?

The Protocols Today. Dispute this, Liars !

Protocols Today Part Two

Letter to a friend "It's not the Jews Dummy"

Identity of the Illuminati

The "Son's of the Synagogue of Satan"Chabad Lubavitch

Chabad Satan Part 1A

Chabad Satan Part 2

Chabad Satan Part 2A

Chabad Satan Part 2B

Chabad Satan Part 3

Chabad Satan Part 3A

Chabad Satan Part 4

Chabad Satan Part 4A

Chabad Satan Part 4B

Chabad Satan Part 4C

Chabad Satan Part 5

Chabad satan Part 5A

Chabad Satan Part 5B

Chabad Satan Part 5C

Chabad Satan Part 6

Chabad Satan Part 6B

Chabad Satan Part 6C

Chabad Satan Part 6D

Chabad Satan Part 7

Chabad Satan Part 7A

Chabad Satan Part 7B

Chabad Satan Part 7C

Chabad Satan Part 8

Chabad Satan Part 8A

Chabad Satan Part 8B

Chabad Satan Part 8C

Chabad Satan Part 8D

Chabad Satan Part 9

Chabad Satan Part 9A

Chabad Satan Part 9B

Chabad Satan Part 9C

Chabad Satan Part 9D

Chabad Satan Part 10

Chabad Satan Part 10A

Chabad Satan Part 10B

Chabad Satan Part 10C

Chabad Satan Part 10D

The Chabad Satan Wall of Destruction

Chabad Wall Part 2

Chabad Wall Part 3

Chabad Wall Part 4

The Chabad Phoenix is Rising

Columbia "The Queen of Heaven"

Patriot Akt II, Comrad 

The Infiltration of the leaven "Jerusalem Council"

Satan's One World Religion

OWR Part 2

OWR Part 3

OWR Part 4

One World Religion Part 5

One World Religion Part 6

One World Religion Part 7  

Re the god of Talmud Bavli

Perpetual Purim

"The Raiser of Taxes"

Jewish Persecution

Obedient Ishmael Kislev 19, 5764

The Final Nazi

Nazi Part 2

Nazi Part 3

Nazi Part 4

The Lord of the Ring, the Return of the Talmudic king

Changing the Time and the Laws

anti-semitism?

Who murdered Jesus the Christ

"Replacement Theology" of Judaic Talmudism

Eating Rainbow Stew with a Silver Spoon, underneath a Noahide Sky

the gods

"The Two Whores"

Noahide News

Noahide News 2

infosam@bellsouth.net